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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

On March 18, 2008, after more than a year of campaigning, Senator Barack Obama
approached a Philadelphia podium to address the issue which had shadowed him since the
beginning of his campaign: race. With the potential to become the first African American
president in U.S. history, Obama’s candidacy was defined by race from the outset. Prior to this
afternoon in Philadelphia, he had generally circumvented the “race question” by choosing to
focus on policy issues instead. Now, though, he was confronted by a daunting rhetorical
situation. Six days earlier, on March 12, 2008, Obama’s long-time spiritual advisor, Rev.
Jeremiah Wright (2008)—a black preacher from Chicago—directed the following incendiary
remarks at Obama’s opponent, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton:
Hillary never had a cab whiz past her and not pick her up because her skin was the wrong
color. Hillary never had to worry about being pulled over in her car as a black man
driving in the wrong … I am sick of [N]egroes who just do not get it. Hillary was not a
black boy raised in a single parent home, Barack was. Barack knows what it means living
in a country and a culture that is controlled by rich white people. Hillary can never know
that. Hillary ain’t never been called a nigger! (as cited in Parker, 2008, para. 6)
Prompted by Wright’s inflammatory rhetoric, Obama was pressed to react to the racial hysteria
which now engulfed his candidacy. He responded with a speech titled “A More Perfect Union.”
In “A More Perfect Union,” Obama (2008) expressed his conviction “that this nation is
more than the sum of its parts—that out of many, we are truly one” (para. 9). He emphasized
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interdependence and implored Americans to overcome the racial discrimination which had
plagued the country. Indeed, Wright’s sentiments, though radical in tone, were based on a racial
history which had seen the systematic subjugation of African Americans. However, the majority
of Americans considered Wright’s remarks both regressive and despicable. To reconcile these
warring constituencies, Obama pointed to the history books:
[Americans] do not need to recite here the history of racial injustice in this country. But
we do need to remind ourselves that so many of the disparities that exist in the AfricanAmerican community today can be directly traced to inequalities passed on from an
earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. (para.
28)
Obama blunted the sting of Wright’s (2008) comments by linking present-day racial disparities
to the inequities of prior generations. In so doing, Obama pressed Americans to consider how the
actions of the past still played a role in contemporary society. Obama (2008) demonstrated his
appreciation for history throughout the oration, but the following passage proved rhetorically
significant on multiple levels:
I was raised with the help of a white grandfather who survived a Depression to serve in
Patton's army during World War II, and a white grandmother who worked on a bomber
assembly line at Fort Leavenworth while he was overseas. (para. 3)
Aside from portraying himself as the embodiment of double consciousness, the physical
manifestation of both black and white ancestry (Terrill, 2009), Obama’s reference was
significant because it invoked one of America’s most resonant narratives—World War II
(WWII).
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“The Good War,” in many regards, revitalized the U.S., propelling the country out of the
Depression, and launching Americans into an era of unprecedented prosperity (Hine, Hine, &
Harrold, 2010). Many rhetorical scholars (Balthrop, Blair, & Michel, 2010; Biesecker, 2002;
Bostdorff, 2003, 2011; Kahl & Leff, 2006; Noon, 2004) have speculated on the implications of
WWII’s role in contemporary American culture. Biesecker (2002) discussed “the pivotal
ideological role WWII has begun to play in U.S. public culture in the present” (p. 394).
Biesecker’s examination of WWII texts highlighted Americans’ thirst for commemorating the
legacy of WWII; to confirm her thesis one must merely peruse the recent explosion of WWII
themes in film, popular television, and print media.1 In many ways, these commemorations
champion the notion that the WWII era was composed of exceptional individuals. For example,
Tom Brokaw (2004) asserted that the Americans who endured the hardships of WWII signify
“the greatest generation any society has produced” (p. xxxviii). Obama’s (2008) reference to
WWII in “A More Perfect Union,” then, could be dismissed as simply another politician cashing
in on the era’s rhetorical currency. Yet, the racial thrust of the speech infused Obama’s WWII
reference with an ironic tension. For, although Obama’s discussion of his grandparents served to
demonstrate how Americans had united to overcome national crises, the historical reality is,
during the WWII era, African Americans still suffered from Jim Crow segregation. In other
words, Obama championed Americans’ WWII sacrifices, but avoided discussing how the era’s
1

See: Hill, G. (Producer), & Malick, T. (Director). (1998). The thin red line [Motion

picture]. U.S.A.: 20th Century Fox; Spielberg, S., & Hanks, T. (Producers), & Hanks, T.
(Director). (2001). Band of brothers [Television mini-series]. U.S.A.: HBO; Spielberg, S.
(Producer), & (Director). (1998). Saving Private Ryan [Motion picture]. U.S.A.: DreamWorks.
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racism contributed to the racial tension which prompted him to deliver “A More Perfect Union”
in the first place. This contradiction is further exacerbated because, in spite of WWII’s popularity
in modern culture, African American narratives from the period continue to be overlooked by
contemporary scholars.
A survey of African American discourse from the WWII era demonstrates diverse
viewpoints within the black community. Blacks were divided across issues including politics,
economics, and education. One especially controversial topic among black spokespersons was
the tension between the war effort and the struggle for civil rights. In spite of these public
controversies, only a few Communication scholars (Crable, 2003; Putnam, 2006a, 2006b, 2007)
have critically examined black discourse from the period. As Putnam (2006a) contended, “the
absence of sustained doctoral level research in black rhetoric contributes to a fragmented and
partial narrative about the history of black rhetoric in the published literature of Communication
Studies” (p. 16). His assertion reveals the need for scholars to continue engaging black discourse
in varying historical contexts. In undertaking such a project, though, one must avoid privileging
the expectations and norms of the present (Hartnett, 2002). Rather, critics must seek to situate
texts within the boundaries of their respective epochs.
Obama went on to win the election, prompting many commentators to claim that his
election marked America’s emergence as a “post-racial” society (Roy & Vaisse, 2008; Schorr,
2008; Steele, 2008). In those hasty declarations, one finds similarities to the ways Americans
have appropriated the memory of WWII: In both cases, watershed achievements have eclipsed
systemic shortcomings. More specifically, though, in both instances, Americans found excuses to
avoid discussing race. Honing in on such moments of strategic evasion is essential to
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understanding how the historical avoidance of race relations has influenced America’s current
racial climate.
My project explores how African Americans continued the quest for civil rights during
WWII. In order to do so, however, one must acknowledge that black spokespersons responded to
competing discourses—particularly, those of U.S. officials such as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. In an era where propaganda pervaded the public sphere,—according to Szasz (2009),
“the Allies dropped two billion [propaganda] leaflets” (p. 538) in the closing days of the Pacific
War alone—the sheer force of the white majority in the U.S. was politically and socially
overwhelming. Thus, non-dominant groups, such as African Americans, were forced to react
from a restricted discursive space. In this regard, my analysis cuts two-fold. First, I examine how
President Roosevelt (1941) galvanized support for his “Four Freedoms” agenda by appealing to
collective values. In appealing to collective values, Roosevelt placed a high demand on
patriotism and unity. Roosevelt’s emphasis on collective values and national unity conveyed a
homogenous sense of American identity which, in turn, discouraged public expression of
minority and/or dissenting viewpoints. Second, I investigate how African American rhetors
employed the principles of “The Four Freedoms” to formulate critiques of institutional racism. In
particular, Ralph Ellison’s wartime editorials explicitly engaged “The Four Freedoms.” Ellison
illustrated how, by tolerating oppressive systems, such as racism, colonialism, and imperialism,
the U.S. and Allied forces actually undermined the ideals of “The Four Freedoms.” I contend
Ellison’s reinvention served to problematize “The Four Freedoms” in a way which highlighted
the prejudices which afflicted African Americans and colonial peoples throughout the world.
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The seeds for my project were planted in an undergraduate seminar with Dr. Aric
Putnam—the topic: The history of African American public address. After that class I began to
realize how much racial oppression had shaped the American experience. Later, in my first year
of graduate study, that consciousness was cultivated into a professional interest. My scholarship
has been propelled further by discovering the relationship between discourse and ideology.
Accordingly, I approach this project from the perspective that examining the intersections of
rhetoric, ideology, and history is necessary to better understanding the power dynamics of
contemporary society. In my view, an individual’s position in society is but one strand in the vast
interlocking fabric of American life; my positionality is, in many ways, no more than the
outcome of historical and ideological conditions. Therefore, I acknowledge the numerous factors
which contribute to my perspective: being a white, educated, middle-class male; growing up in a
conservative, blue-collar, small town in Minnesota; enjoying the advantages of a progressive
education; and perhaps most importantly, coming of political age during the Obama era. Above
all, though, my project echoes Guterl’s (2002) argument that virtually “everything we in
America do, or think, or say, is informed by race” (p. 3). Accordingly, my project seeks to
illuminate how race is textured by the material collusion of rhetoric, ideology, and history.
Precis of Remaining Chapters
To explore these issues fully, I have divided the project into chapters which help to better
frame the historical, theoretical, and critical concerns. In Chapter Two, I survey rhetorical texts,
historical events, and scholarly literature which help to contextualize the environment of U.S.
race relations during the early 20th century. Starting at the turn of the 20th century, black civic
leaders began crafting culturally-specific programs for gaining political, social, and economic
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rights. However, due to the pervasiveness of institutional racism, black spokespersons were
largely limited to adopting reactive positions. Analyzing the interplay of rhetoric and public
affairs which occurred during the 1900s-1930s helps to frame how institutional racism
influenced the political culture of black America during the WWII era.
In Chapter Three I examine the reciprocal relationship between rhetoric and ideology. As
McGee (1979; 1980) demonstrated, rhetoric and ideology converge in the material presence of
ideographs. McGee’s framework illuminates how rhetoric and ideology conspire to produce
asymmetrical distributions of power. Charting ideographs enables critics to better understand
how rhetors harness discourse to (re)characterize material conditions. Analyzing these
intersections reveals how culture and identity are constituted through the confluence of symbolic
structures and material conditions.
In Chapter Four, I investigate how black author and literary critic, Ralph Ellison,
responded to the political culture of the WWII era. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
delivered the address “The Four Freedoms,” in which he expressed four essential human
freedoms which he contended must guide the U.S. war effort. In “The Four Freedoms,”
Roosevelt insisted that Americans must protect their freedoms and, moreover, must dedicate
themselves to the ideals of patriotism and unity. However, such expectations were problematic
because U.S. institutional racism prevented certain peoples, particularly African Americans,
from experiencing the basic civil rights which most Americans associated with freedom. This
disconnect drew responses from several African American spokespersons. Ellison, in particular,
illustrated how “The Four Freedoms” were unattainable until oppressive systems, such as
institutional racism and colonialism, were eradicated. Specifically, between 1942 and 1943,
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Ellison addressed the problem of “The Four Freedoms” with a series of editorials in the black
periodical The Negro Quarterly: A Review of Negro Life and Culture. I conclude that Ellison’s
wartime editorials reoriented the connotations of “The Four Freedoms,” suggesting liberty, not
the preservation of freedom, should be the central motive of the U.S. and Allied forces.
In the concluding chapter I explore the historical and theoretical significance of the
rhetorical phenomena which I examine in Chapter Four. Specifically, I reflect on how my project
accents contemporary understandings of the junctures between race and the American
experience. I close by contemplating what this project demonstrates about contemporary
discourses on race.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

A study of African American rhetoric from WWII is grounded in two general
assumptions. My project extends from the assumption that public communication has an impact
on society. Moreover, my project assumes rhetoric and culture share a reciprocal relationship.
Accordingly, the following literature review serves two primary functions. First, the review
contextualizes events, attitudes, and discourses which impacted the rhetorical and political
culture of black America during the WWII era. Second, the review demonstrates how black
spokespersons from the epoch shaped their political programs in response to the ideological
constraints of institutional racism.
Modern Black Leadership
At the turn of the 20th century, African Americans were in need of modern civic
leadership. Three distinctive black leaders emerged during the era: Booker T. Washington,
Marcus Garvey, and W.E.B. Du Bois. Each man proposed a program for how black Americans
should seek social and political change. These men and the rhetoric with which they advocated
their programs shaped black political leadership during the WWII era.
Booker T. Washington gained notoriety after establishing the Tuskegee Institute, an allblack college in Alabama. His ascension as a civic leader can be traced to his famous 1895
address, “The Atlanta Compromise.” In the speech, Washington (1895) urged blacks to appease
their white neighbors:
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To those of my race who depend on bettering their condition in a foreign land or who
underestimate the importance of cultivating friendly relations with the Southern white
man who is their next-door neighbor, I would say: “Cast down your bucket where you
are”—cast it down, making friends in every manly way of the people of all races by
whom you are surrounded. (para. 5)
As illustrated in the quotation above, Washington’s plan called for blacks to develop skills in
menial tasks so they could advance economically (Smock, 2009). As a result of his growing
popularity, by 1900, he was regarded the most influential black leader in America (Hine, Hine, &
Harrold, 2010). According to Huggins (2007), behind Washington’s emphasis on the industrial
and agricultural training of blacks was an adamant rejection of intellectualism. There were some,
though, who protested his social gospel of industry, humility, and patience (Lewis, 1997). Chief
among them was W.E.B. Du Bois, who decried Washington’s model as conciliation to white
supremacy. Speaking of the Washingtonian approach, Du Bois (1903/2003) argued:
[Washington’s] doctrine has tended to make the whites, North and South, shift the burden
of the Negro problem to the Negro’s shoulders and stand aside as critical and rather
pessimistic spectators; when in fact the burden belongs to the nation, and the hands of
none of us are clean if we bend not our energies to righting these great wrongs. (46)
Though he made great strides in providing economic stability for blacks, ultimately,
Washington’s program revealed its shortcomings. Ironically, as Washington’s life came to a
close in 1915, the tides of white oppression surged. One indication of this reality was the release
of the racist film The Birth of a Nation—a film which depicted black men as villainous predators
of white women, and Klansmen as chivalrous heroes. Though Washington’s leadership appears
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conservative and submissive to contemporary scholars, Baker (2001) pointed out Washington’s
approach was consistent with other American capitalists from the era, except, Washington built
institutions with the purpose of serving the black majority. Nonetheless, as Washington was laid
to rest, so, too, was his program of go-slow accommodation.
Building on Washington’s social gospel in significant ways, Marcus Garvey—a fiery,
Jamaican immigrant who rose to prominence in Harlem in 1917—espoused a program of Black
Nationalism and radical separatism. Garvey captivated blacks with his passionate Pan-African
rhetoric, vowing to liberate the earth’s “four hundred million … darker peoples” (as cited in
Lewis, 1997, p. 35). As an advocate of Pan-Africanism, Garvey insisted a cultural kinship
existed between Africans and members of the African Diaspora. By and large, Garvey chased his
Pan-African vision through the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA)—an
organization that, according to Garvey (1922/1994), was dedicated to “advocating the cause of
Africa for the Africans” (p. 17). As the UNIA gained traction, it provided Garvey the platform to
reach out to blacks in America and the West Indies, urging them to build “a racial empire of
[their] own in [the] Motherland” (p. 17). Fundamentally, Garvey’s race-conscious program was
transnational; in his calculus, rather than resolve systemic shortcomings, the only way to
reconcile centuries of discrimination was to unite blacks in Africa. Garvey hoped to supplant
racial hostility by reestablishing blacks in Africa, where they could then form an independent
state:
There is no other way to avoid the threatening war of the races that is bound to engulf all
mankind, which has been prophesied by the world’s greatest thinkers; there is no better
method than by apportioning every race to its own habitat. (Garvey, p. 20)
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Though his shipping outfit, the Black Star Line Steamship Corporation, would make many
voyages between the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa, ultimately, the organization
floundered. Jailed for mail fraud in 1922, Garvey was deported to Jamaica in 1927 after which
the UNIA and the Back to Africa movement disbanded (Gates & Burton, 2011). Nonetheless,
Garvey’s transnational rhetoric was significant, for he inspired blacks to seek political autonomy
through racial identification.
W.E.B. Du Bois emerged as the foremost voice among black spokespersons during the
late 1910s. Greatly at odds with Booker T. Washington’s social gospel, Du Bois argued that a
“talented tenth,” a collection of intellectual black elites, was necessary to lead the charge against
racial oppression (Huggins, 2007; Lewis, 1997). In Du Bois’ assessment, this “talented tenth”
would serve as paragons for the rest of the race, thus, uplifting the black masses by raising both
intellectual and cultural standards. Through sparring with rival black spokesmen, Booker T.
Washington and Marcus Garvey, Du Bois distinguished himself by linking American white
supremacy to the subjugation of colonial peoples throughout the world. For instance, when
challenged for his contradictory positions regarding the Russian Revolution and Pan-Africanism,
Du Bois (1921/2011c) responded with the following:
We have an immediate program for Negro emancipation laid down and thought out by
the N.A.A.C.P. It is foolish for us to give up this practical program for mirage in Africa
or by seeking to join a revolution which we do not at present understand. On the other
hand, … it would be just as foolish for us to sneer or even seem to sneer at the bloodentwined writhing of hundreds of millions of our whiter human brothers. (p. 307)
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The above quotation encapsulates Du Bois’ aspirations: though black American interests were
couched in a broader colonial struggle, the well-being of black Americans remained his first
priority. To this end, Du Bois strove for peaceful, racial integration—anything less was failure.
Du Bois’ rhetorical leadership placed emphasis on cultural performance and critique; in so doing,
he demonstrated that blacks could garner political efficacy by centering black American culture.
Washington, Garvey, and Du Bois each advocated starkly different political programs;
however, they were united through their allegiance to developing modern black leadership.
Washington’s modernism manifested in an economic program centered on black industrial
growth. Washington did not assail institutional racism; rather, he operated within its ideological
boundaries. In so doing, he offered blacks material gains and economic self-sufficiency.
Garvey’s modernism produced the “Back to Africa” movement. Garvey’s race-conscious
rhetoric awakened blacks’ desires for political autonomy. Although, the program was ultimately
derailed by his deportation, Garvey’s influence would live on through the voices of Black
Nationalism and black radicalism. Du Bois’ modernism resulted in the expansion of political
activism and integrationist civic organizations. His goal of racial integration established the
trajectory of black leadership during the first half of the 20th century. Moreover, Du Bois’
insistence that African Americans were linked in struggle with other colonial peoples inspired
black activists to challenge colonialism throughout the world.
The NAACP, The Crisis, and the Advancement of the Black Press
Du Bois’ emphasis on culture changed the way black leadership could be expressed.
Though rhetoric was significant to Washington’s leadership from the standpoint that his
conciliatory message suppressed discussion, his program generally promoted advances in labor
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and capital, not changes in state policies. Du Bois, however, advocated traditional political
action. Indeed, Du Bois was instrumental to the founding of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), an agency which proved pivotal in fighting for
African American political rights during the early 20th century (Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2010).
The NAACP stimulated civil rights dialogue through its monthly publication, The Crisis, which
Du Bois edited until 1935 (Lewis, 1993). During the first quarter of the 20th century, The Crisis
framed the complexities of African American life in relation to the objective of equal citizenship
(Huggins, 2007; Lewis, 1993, 1997). That mindset seeped into the black press,2 prompting many
black journalists to adopt increasingly critical tones, which consequently generated critical
discussion among African Americans. During the 1910s, several black periodicals adjusted their
tenor, arguing more explicitly for equal citizenship. I contend this shift reflected growing
discontent within the black community and, in turn, fostered a militant rhetorical praxis among
black activists.
Beginning in 1905 with the Niagara Movement, Du Bois sought to form an organization
that would “[demand] an end to segregation, [appeal] for better schools, health care, and
housing; [protest] the discrimination endured by black soldiers; and [criticize] the racial
prejudice of most churches” (Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2010, p. 380). But for myriad reasons, the
Niagara Movement never gained a foothold and, ultimately, disbanded in 1911. Yet, just as the

2

The term “black press” could be understood to possess various different meanings.

When I use the term “black press” I refer to periodicals that were owned and operated by black
Americans.
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Niagara Movement dissolved, the NAACP was being forged by a group of black civic leaders
and white liberals.
The NAACP declared its chief goal was to secure for “black citizens … the civil and
political rights the Constitution guaranteed to all citizens” (Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2010, p. 381).
Though in conflict with the precepts of Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee machine, the
NAACP’s progressive style steadily won over the hearts and minds of many Americans—both
black and white. While technically directed by white literary scholar Joel E. Spingarn, in the eyes
of black Americans, Du Bois was the NAACP (Lewis, 1997). Beginning with the magazine’s
founding in 1910, Du Bois’ editorials in The Crisis functioned as the mouthpiece of the
organization.
Though the black press had been active since the 1820s, in the 1910s, black journalists
became increasingly political, harnessing journalism as a tool for advancing their causes and
views (Wolseley, 1990). So, as WWI escalated in Europe, and the U.S. edged closer to entering,
the black press developed a reporting style which advocated for civil rights but simultaneously
kept an eye on the war. During this time, black periodicals, such as the Chicago Defender,
became critical forums for black discourse. With America’s entry into the war looming, the black
press seized the opportunity to develop cultural militancy (Jordan, 2001). Black periodicals
commonly revealed America’s contradicting positions: support for international democracy on
one hand and acceptance for domestic white supremacy on the other (Jordan). In this regard,
black periodicals deviated from the objective standards of journalism—namely, the reporting of
“straight news”—and, instead, adopted a style which articulated news stories according to the
specific concerns of African Americans.
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The Chicago Defender embraced this activist tone and became one of the most popular
black newspapers during the 1910s. The Defender was instrumental in promoting the Great
Migration—the mass exodus of blacks from southern to northern cities (Gates & Burton, 2011;
Jordan, 2001; Simmons, 1998; Wolseley, 1990). “Come north … all you folks, both good and
bad” (as cited in Simmons, 1998, p. 37), the Defender implored its southern black readers. And
so they came in droves; during the late 1910s, an estimated 700,000 to 1,000,000 African
Americans relocated to the north (Jordan, 2001). Throughout WWI, the Defender shifted
between supporting the war effort and battling for black rights. In this regard, the Defender
exemplified a broader rhetorical current in black journalism: choosing words and shaping
arguments “not simply with black readers in mind but to awaken the consciences of white
readers as well” (Jordan, p. 2).
With the war looming, black journalists were splintered along ideological lines, mainly
according to whether or not they advocated conditional or unconditional patriotism. Some black
writers succumbed to patriotic pressure after President Wilson (1917) pronounced, “The world
must be made safe for democracy” (para. 35). Others, however, viewed such appeals as
rhetorical capital, and formulated responses which blended accommodation and protest. For
instance, in a 1917 editorial entitled “No Time Now for Rebellion,” the Baltimore AfroAmerican claimed, “Now is the time to continue our insistence upon right, and now is the time to
demand guarantees before going to war willingly … BUT NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR
REBELLION” (as cited in Jordan, 2001, p. 71). According to Jordan, such rejoinders served,
among other purposes, to “make a convincing case that the government should take action to
address the concerns of blacks—for example, by legislating against lynching—as a war
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measure” (p. 73). Such concerns were justified considering the growing frequency of violence
against blacks. While President Wilson busied himself with making the world safe for
democracy, from 1914-1916, vigilantes lynched 126 African Americans in 10 southern states
(Jordan). Black editorialists highlighted this inconsistency by juxtaposing the atrocities in Europe
with the lynching of blacks in the South. For instance, writing for the New York Age, James
Weldon Johnson (1917) decried American hypocrisy, citing the recent brutal murder of a black
man:
this nation is … ready to raise armies and navies to uphold the principle of international
law … [while] within its own borders one of its own citizens is taken from the custody of
the lawfully constituted courts and burned at the stake by a mob [but] will not call for the
raising even of a sheriff’s posse. (as cited in Jordan, 2001, pp. 42-43)
As the U.S. joined forces against the Central Powers, black journalists would be forced to tailor
their rhetoric according to the competing demands of international democracy and domestic
racial violence, all the while maintaining support for their country.
Black Participation in WWI
After nearly three years of nonparticipation, the U.S. officially joined the Allied forces on
April 6, 1917 (Williams, 2010). Upon entering WWI, President Wilson self-consciously framed
the U.S. as a purely magnanimous supporter of international democracy. Ironically, such
principles did not apply to racial justice locally—blacks remained constrained racial oppression.
In turn, Americans were soon confronted with the question of whether or not African Americans
would serve in the war. Even though blacks had served in all previous American wars, dating
back to the Revolutionary War, the matter was heavily disputed. Black civic leaders, such as
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W.E.B. Du Bois, viewed the war as an opportunity for blacks to prove their civic worth, and
perhaps inch closer to equal citizenship. In a 1918 editorial entitled “Close Ranks,” Du Bois
penned:
We of the colored race have no ordinary interest in the outcome. That which the German
power represents today spells death to the aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for
equality, freedom and democracy … We make no ordinary sacrifice, but we make it
gladly and willingly with our eyes lifted to the hills. (p. 294)
In spite of Du Bois’ optimism, blacks were met by strong opposition from the white majority—
especially Southerners. Many Southerners feared arming African Americans in the war effort
would lead to a violent backlash upon their return home (Williams, 2010). For instance,
Mississippi Senator James K. Varaman (1996) opined, “I know of no greater menace to the
South than this” (as cited in Brandt, p. 59). Ultimately, the federal government granted black
participation in the war, with nearly 380,000 blacks enlisted by war’s end (Brandt, 1996; Moore,
2005; Williams, 2010). Lentz-Smith (2009) contended the Great War stands as one of the
transformative moments in African American history. I, too, argue the Great War was
transformative for African Americans, particularly to the extent it forced black activists to reconceptualize and then re-articulate the tenets of democracy.
As the war continued in Europe, hate crimes against blacks surged domestically. On July
2, merely 12 weeks after Wilson’s declaration of war, a bloody race riot overtook the industrial
city of East Saint Louis, Illinois (Lewis, 1997; Huggins, 2007). At least 40 blacks were killed
and thousands were burned out of their homes (Brandt, 1996). To protest the violence, on July
28, the NAACP organized a march through the streets of New York City (Huggins, 2007; Lewis,
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1997). Headed by Du Bois and James Weldon Johnson, approximately 10,000 protesters
marched silently down Fifth Avenue, displaying signs with slogans such as “‘Thou Shalt Not
Kill,’ … ‘MR PRESIDENT, WHY NOT MAKE AMERICA SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY’ …
[and] ‘YOUR HANDS ARE FULL OF BLOOD’” (Lewis, p. 10). Barely a month later, racial
discontent erupted again, this time in Houston, Texas. Beleaguered by white oppression, black
soldiers from the 24th Infantry Battalion took to the streets, killing 17 whites (Ellis, 2001;
Williams, 2010). In the aftermath, 63 black soldiers were court-martialed, 13 of whom were
hanged immediately (Wynn, 2010). The year 1917 closed with 38 documented lynchings
(Jordan, 2001). However, race-based violence would only escalate in subsequent years.
The majority of African American troops stationed in France performed service or labor
tasks: loading and unloading ships, building roads and dams, digging trenches, and burying the
rotting corpses of dead soldiers (Williams, 2010). Indeed, the nearly 30,000 black troops fighting
on the front lines were an underwhelming minority. Accordingly, consternation eventually grew
over the racial hierarchies which relegated blacks to menial tasks, particularly the conditions
which stymied blacks from ascending to officer positions. After extensive protest from black
civic leaders, in June of 1917, the federal government finally capitulated to their demands and
established a segregated officer-training camp in Des Moines, IA (Williams, 2010; Wynn, 2010).
However, no camp—whether segregated or otherwise—was a place of refuge for black troops.
The conditions on training bases were often comparable to the harshest Jim Crow environments.
For instance, Private Silas Bradshaw, a black soldier stationed in Camp A.A. Humphreys,
Virginia, lamented in a letter to his former commanding officer:
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We hafter eat in the rain nowhere to wash out cloths and no where to take a bath only the
Macomack River no latrine and sleeping in tents with no floor and nothing to sleep under
only what we brought with us. (p. 105, as cited in Williams, 2010)
Compounding those conditions, the Des Moines officer camp, the vaunted triumph of black
activists, proved merely a symbolic victory. For, even after completing the program, black
officers were restricted to serving in segregated units.
Whatever prejudice black soldiers experienced on domestic bases, conditions were
typically worse on the battlefront. Oftentimes the mistreatment of blacks abroad was linked to
domestic pressures. For instance, in August of 1918, hostility became so intense among Southern
whites that the U.S. Army sent a secret communique to French officials advising them to not
commend blacks too highly, particularly in the presence of white Americans (Lewis, 1997). This
secret communique, which was entitled Secret Information Concerning Black Troops, warned
the French that if blacks and whites fraternized there was a strong chance black men would rape
French women (Huggins, 2007). In spite of American racism, the French cherished the service of
black troops. Indeed, black soldiers generally enjoyed better treatment from Frenchmen than
from their white compatriots. A compelling example is the French government’s praise for the
all-black 15th Regiment of New York’s National Guard. Better known as the “Harlem Hell
Fighters,” the 15th served admirably during their tour in France. The Hell Fighters remained at
the front for over 190 days, longer than any American regiment and never relented during
combat (Nelson, 2009). The Hell Fighters were even the first Allied unit to reach the Rhine
(Brandt, 1996). For their valor, the entire unit was awarded the Croix de Guerre—“Cross of
War”—by the French government (Brandt; Huggins, 2007; Lewis, 1997; Nelson, 2009;
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Williams, 2010). According to Williams, the camaraderie that developed between the French and
all-black units such as the Hell Fighters cultivated “a site where democracy and aspirations for
freedom could become a reality” (p. 183).
Upon returning home, black soldiers were encouraged by the adulation they received in
their communities. Harlem residents came out in droves to greet their beloved Hell Fighters.
Lewis (1997) described the fanfare: “A field of pennants, flags, banners, and scarves thrashed
about the soldiers like elephant grass in a gale, threatening to engulf them” (p. 5). The streets of
Harlem that day purportedly teemed with blacks, anxious to celebrate the achievements of their
troops. However, white America would not meet its black countrymen with such appreciation.
WWI called upon the military service of nearly 380,000 black Americans and the
patriotism of millions more; WWI inspired Du Bois (1918/2011a) to surmise that an Allied
victory would “inaugurate the United States of the World” (p. 294); WWI, however, did not
yield tangible civic improvements in the lives of African Americans. Jim Crow still reigned
supreme. Many of the same whites who unquestioningly supported democracy throughout the
war, recanted those democratic principles when applied to the lives of black Americans. In grand
departure from the patriotic tenor of his wartime editorial “Close Ranks,” after the war, Du Bois
(1919) reproached American hypocrisy with the following critique: “It lynches … It
disfranchises its own citizens … It encourages ignorance … It steals from us … It insults us” (p.
8, emphasis in original). Ultimately, 1918, the year the world was made “safe for democracy,”
came to a close with the documented lynching of 78 African Americans (Lewis, 1997; Wynn,
2010). Black protesters who had diligently suppressed their critiques of race relations during the
war were disillusioned by the scorn of postwar rejection. Now, though, black activists would

22
summon the militancy that suffused their prewar discourse and would urge the black masses to
reject anything short of full civic participation.
Race Riots Foster Race Consciousness
The armistice brought WWI to a close on November 11, 1918 (Nelson, 2009; Williams,
2010). Nevertheless, the struggle was far from over for African American soldiers. As black
troops returned to the U.S., they were confronted with a revitalized spirit of white supremacy.
While Americans had been focusing their attention on the war in Europe, the seeds for a race war
were germinating domestically. The year 1919 was plagued by at least 25 race riots throughout
the country,the North included (Lewis, 1997; Williams, 2010). At the same time, fueled by the
biological racism popularized by Madison Grant, the Ku Klux Klan enjoyed a resurgence starting
in the late 1910s. These interrelated factors precipitated a climate of increased race
consciousness. African Americans, in particular, adopted a nuanced racial politics under the
heading “New Negro.” The subsequent growth of the New Negro Movement—in its varying
manifestations—marked the symbolic death of conciliatory politics and established agitation as
the favored vehicle for obtaining civil rights. In many ways, the racial strife of the postwar
period cultivated a cultural consciousness which stirred black Americans to explore new forms
of expression during the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s.
With the war behind them, black soldiers returned home emboldened by their
experiences. Though the wartime performance of black troops was meaningful to most African
Americans, few invested as much interest in their accomplishments as W.E.B. Du Bois. By
curbing his critiques of race relations, and fully supporting the war effort, Du Bois had staked his
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reputation as the preeminent voice of black activism. The return of black soldiers inspired Du
Bois (1919) to rediscover his critical tone:
The faults of our country are our faults. Under similar circumstances, we would fight
again. But by the God of heaven, we are cowards and jackasses if now that the war is
over we do not marshal every ounce of our brain and brawn to fight a sterner, longer,
more unbending battle against the forces of hell in our own land.
We return.
We return from fighting.
We return fighting. (p. 5, emphasis in original)
However, the boldness expressed in Du Bois’ editorial would be challenged by rampant racebased violence in the subsequent months.
Black civic leaders’ prewar hopes of equal citizenship proved to be nothing more than a
pipedream. Despite the wartime service of black troops, their sacrifice did not translate to civic
improvements. Rather, the postwar era marked a regression in race relations, ushering in a wave
of racial violence unequalled since Reconstruction (Williams, 2010). Aside from the lynching of
76 blacks, 1919 also gave way to vicious race riots in major U.S. cities, most notably
Washington, D.C. and Chicago (Huggins, 2007; Lewis, 1997; Williams, 2010). According to
Voogd (2007), the Red Summer race riots of 1919 “represent the height of white mob riot
activity in the United States, never surpassed in frequency, breadth, or severity” (p. 550). The
Washington, D.C. riot began on Saturday, July 18, 1919 (Williams, 2010). Fueled by the rumor
that two black men had assaulted a white woman, tensions escalated until the city was
entrenched in a full scale race war (Voogd, 2007; Williams, 2010). After three days of unrest, six
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people were dead and several hundred were wounded (Williams). Just as the D.C. riot quieted,
though, another riot broke out in Chicago on July 27. While swimming at a municipal lake,
Eugene Williams, a young black boy, crossed over into the lake’s restricted “white area,” at
which point whites began hurling rocks at him from the beach (Voogd, 2007; Williams, 2010
Wynn, 2010). One rock reached its intended target, striking Eugene in the head and causing him
to drown. Enraged by a police officer’s refusal to arrest the rock throwers, blacks on the scene
began to voice their frustrations and, ultimately, it was the black citizens who were arrested on a
charge of disturbing of the peace (Voogd, 2007). Pandemonium followed. After 14 days of
violence, 38 were dead (15 whites and 23 blacks), 537 wounded, and more than 1,000 homeless
(Lewis, 1997; Williams, 2010). The Chicago race riot signaled the actual scope of America’s
“race problem.” No longer could institutional racism be discussed as an exclusively Southern
dilemma.
During the era, the flames of racial tension were fanned by the racist philosophies which
spread from the nascent field of eugenics, otherwise known as “race science.” One of the leading
proponents of eugenics in the early 20th century was a blue-blood named Madison Grant. In
1916, Grant published The Passing of the Great Race: Or, the Racial Basis of European History,
in which he espoused his belief in the racial superiority of the Nordic race—“Nordic” signifying
those of pure white European ancestry. Grant contended three races existed in Europe: the
Nordic, the Alpine, and the Mediterranean; however, the Nordic was the superior of the three,
and thus “could be found throughout the world in positions of power and influence” (Guterl,
2002, p. 35). In regards to the so-called “Negro problem,” Grant believed that as long as blacks
remained “fixed in [their] place in the South … they would be welcome in America” (Guterl, p.
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37). Naturally, though, the relocation of blacks to northern cities during the Great Migration
challenged that condition. Fragments of Grant’s philosophies have been observed in the
principles of the second Ku Klux Klan. Reestablished by William Joseph Simmons in 1915, the
second Klan declared itself the country’s fiercest defender of so-called “pure Americanism”
(MacLean, 1994). The second Klan condemned “organized blacks, Catholics, and Jews, along
with the insidious encroachments of Bolshevism” (MacLean, p. 5). The Klan’s racist doctrine
spread like wildfire. By 1925, the Klan boasted more than 1,000,000 members, with constituents
in every corner of the country (McGee, 2003). The ascension of the second Klan demonstrates
the rhetorical potency of racist discourse during the early 20th century. Relevant to my study is
the nature in which Klan leadership used Booker T. Washington’s (1895) conciliatory stance in
“The Atlanta Compromise” to justify their opposition to racial integration. With the old
approaches failing them, and even aiding white supremacists in some instances, black activists
were forced to reinvent how blackness was both conceptualized and discussed. The result was
the “New Negro.”
The “New Negro” and the Harlem Renaissance
Scholars have traced variations of the term “New Negro” to as far back as the 1870s
(Gates & Jarrett, 2007). However, I am primarily concerned with how the “New Negro” was
appropriated during and immediately following WWI. In this era, black spokespersons used the
term “New Negro” to symbolize various political programs, ranging from William Pickens’
accommodationism to A. Philip Randolph’s radical socialism. Ultimately, though, the “New
Negro” was concretized in Alain Locke’s Harlem Renaissance movement of the 1920s. Locke
(1925/1995) articulated the “New Negro” as a fresh generation of blacks who were concerned
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with art, literature, and folk culture—cultural artists who were far removed from Randolph’s
political radicalism. Locke’s rhetorical move deemphasized political activism and, instead,
encouraged expressive production—stimulating blacks to assert their identities and explore their
cultural origins.
At the turn of the century, Booker T. Washington was considered the cutting edge of
“New Negroes.” Take, for instance, the title of the book which Washington authored in 1900, A
New Negro for a New Century (Nadell, 2004). However, much had changed for black Americans
since the turn of the century, and by 1919, Washington was now the quintessential “Old Negro.”
Indeed, WWI, and the race-based violence which broke out after the war, altered the civic
perspective of many African Americans. For instance, consider the prewar sentiments of black
spokesperson William Pickens (1916/2007): “The new Negro is a sober, sensible creature,
conscious of his environment, knowing that not all is right, but trying hard to become adjusted to
this civilization in which he finds himself by no will or choice of his own” (p. 84). Then,
compare Pickens’ statement with remarks delivered by Marcus Garvey (1919/2007) three years
later: “We are preparing to shed [blood] one day on the African battlefield, because it is the
determination of the New Negro to re-possess himself of that country that God gave his
forefathers” (p. 93). Pickens (1916/2007) utilized the term “New Negro” to express a program
where blacks slowly adjusted and integrated to the conditions of America; Garvey (1919/2007)
harnessed the same term to describe a program where blacks militantly rejected the boundaries of
America so to seek political autonomy in Africa. The “New Negro” was many things to different
spokespersons. Frequently, though, the militancy fostered in the postwar era was reflected in
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“New Negro” discourse. For instance, in 1919, in the socialist organ The Messenger, A. Philip
Randolph asserted:
As among all other peoples, the New Crowd must be composed of young men who are
educated, radical and fearless…. The condition [sic] for joining the New Crowd are:
ability, radicalism and sincerity…. The New Crowd is uncompromising. Its tactics are
not defensive but offensive…. The New Crowd sees that the war came, that the Negro
fought, bled and died; that the war has ended, and he is not yet free. (p. 20)
Scholars maintain the initial postwar appropriations of the “New Negro” signaled the rising
radicalism among younger blacks and, thus, resulted in political programs such as PanAfricanism, Black Nationalism, and radical anti-capitalism (Foley, 2003; Huggins, 1995; Lewis,
1994). Given the varying conceptions of the “New Negro,” Gates and Jarrett (2007) surmised the
term essentially signified “an irresistible, spontaneously generated black and sufficient self” (p.
4). Indeed, the desire for self-determination was prevalent in conceptualizations of the “New
Negro.”
Eventually, the “New Negro” would be divorced from its radical connotations. Directed
under the aegis of black intellectual Alain Locke, in 1925, black writers, intellectuals and artists
collaborated to produce an anthology titled The New Negro: An Interpretation. According to
Locke (1925/1995), who served as editor of the anthology, the emergence of black art and
literature marked blacks’ first opportunity “for group expression and self-determination” (p. 50).
“The New Negro,” Locke asserted, “is keenly responsive as an augury of a new democracy in
American culture” (p. 51). Though that new democracy could yield political rights someday,
Locke admonished that the present hope “rests in the revaluation by white and black alike of the
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Negro in terms of his artistic endowments and cultural contributions, past and prospective” (p.
55). The publication of The New Negro anthology marked a shift in “New Negro” discourse from
political radicalism to romantic culturalism (Gates & Jarrett, 2007). The postwar energies which
generated race consciousness and militancy were channeled to an arts and literature movement
centered in Harlem. The movement, which would come to be known as the Harlem Renaissance,
spurred an explosion of African American art, literature, and cultural expression. In Baker’s
(1987) assessment, the Harlem Renaissance functioned as a site for “expressive production” (p.
8), which, in turn, produced a “resonantly and continuously productive set of tactics, strategies,
and syllables that [took] form at the turn of the century and [extend] to our own day” (pp. 91-92).
The Harlem Renaissance opened the floodgates of black creative expression. Yet,
Locke’s (1928) vision for the movement to provide blacks artists with a “vehicle of free and
purely artistic expression” (p. 313) would be encumbered by the eventual commodification of
black art. As black art emerged as the vogue of American culture, the demands of white
patronage confronted the “New Negro” movement with the pressures of white hegemony (Watts,
2001). Black artists from the era produced seminal works which continue to be celebrated and
analyzed today. For instance, Langston Hughes’ 1921 poem “The Negro Speaks of Rivers” is
noteworthy for its modernist sense of identity:
I’ve known rivers:
I’ve known rivers ancient as the world and older than the
flow of human blood in human veins. (p. 23)
Reflecting on the era’s creative exploits in his 1940 autobiography The Big Sea, Hughes recalled
that the “Negro vogue of the 20’s” was so pervasive that its cultural elements spilled over into
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“books, African sculpture, music, and dancing” (p. 224). However, the popularity of black
culture did not translate into tangible gains for most black Americans. “The ordinary Negroes,”
Hughes contended, “hadn’t heard of the Negro Renaissance. And if they had, it hadn’t raised
their wages any” (p. 228). Lewis (1994) corroborated Hughes’ sentiments by illustrating how the
elitism of the Harlem Renaissance prevented the movement from improving conditions for the
black masses, likely only benefitting 10,000 of the estimated 10 million blacks who lived in
American during the 1920s.
In The New Negro, Locke (1925/1995) sought to dissociate black artists and writers from
the political sphere: “The great social gain in this is the releasing of our talented group from the
arid field of controversy and debate to the productive fields of creative expression” (p. 56).
Conversely, Du Bois, Locke’s chief intellectual rival, maintained black artists should infuse their
work with propaganda. According to Watts (2001), “Du Bois argued for black artists to perform
social work, while Locke affirmed the need for black artists to express universal values” (p. 184).
Watts contended the debates between Du Bois and Locke were less about literary theory than
they were about rhetorical praxis. Foley (2003), on the other hand, rejected the notion that the
“New Negroes” transition to art and literature was rhetorical; rather, she interpreted the move as
an admission of political inefficacy: “with the failure of the bid for working-class power, politics
flees to the realm of the aesthetic” (p. 70). However, as Burke (1973) observed, “[a]esthetical
values are intermingled with ethical values—and the ethical is the basis of the practical” (p. 234).
For African Americans, the Harlem Renaissance may have marked a flight to aestheticism;
however, as Burke demonstrated, the aesthetic sphere is inherently rhetorical. Thus, the Harlem
Renaissance should not be overlooked for its rhetorical and political contributions.
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Renaissance artists frequently debated the underpinnings of black art. Aside from the
fundamental issue of “art vs. propaganda,” Harelmites hedged at complex issues such as form,
purpose, and identity. Those issues were critically examined in a 1926 editorial exchange
between Langston Hughes and George S. Schuyler. Schuyler initiated the exchange with an
editorial in The Nation titled “Negro Art Hokum.” For Schuyler (1926/1995), the notion of a
genuine black art was laughable, because in his calculus, the American black was “merely a
lampblacked Anglo-Saxon” (p. 310). Schuyler suggested one’s identity was shaped more by
geography and class than race: “Negroes and whites from the same localities in this country talk,
think, and act about the same” (p. 310). Schuyler concluded that the black artists and intellectuals
who insisted upon the uniqueness of black Americans merely reinforced the implications of race
difference and thus reinforced white hegemony. The following week The Nation printed Hughes’
(1926/1995a) rejoinder, “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain.” Hughes began the piece by
telling the story of a promising young black poet who simply wanted to be a poet—“not a Negro
poet” (p. 305). Hughes lamented over the young black poet’s attitude:
[T]his is the mountain standing in the way of any true Negro art in America—this urge
within the race toward whiteness, the desire to pour racial individuality into the mold of
American standardization, and to be as little Negro and as much American as possible.
(p. 305)
In Hughes’ assessment, if black artists rejected their black identities, they would paradoxically
sever form and content, in turn, stratifying whiteness as the cultural standard.
Scholars are divided as to when the Harlem Renaissance officially ended, yet most agree
it collapsed alongside the U.S. economy after the stock market crash of 1929 (Baker, 1987; Gates
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& Jarrett, 2007; Huggins, 2007; Lewis, 1997; Nadell, 2004). According to Gates and Jarrett
(2007), the “New Negro” of the Harlem Renaissance “transformed the militancy associated with
the trope and translated it into a romantic, apolitical movement of the arts” (p. 13). Moreover,
Gates and Jarrett contended the rhetorical shift projected modern blacks as “more deserving than
the Old Negro because [the New Negro] had been reconstructed as an entity somehow ‘new’” (p.
14). Still, Harlem Renaissance historians Huggins (2007) and Lewis (1997) considered the
movement a failure. Huggins (2007) concluded the movement failed due to its provinciality.
Lewis (1997), on the other hand, surmised the Harlem Renaissance was doomed by its overly
ambitious scope. Baker (1987) countered such logic with the following: “To ask why the
renaissance failed is to agree, at the very outset, that the twenties did not have profoundly
beneficial effects for areas of Afro-American discourse that we have only recently begun to
explore in depth” (p. 12, emphasis in original). Ultimately, Baker concluded the “New Negro”
movement—in its entirety—broadened and enlarged the traditional field of African American
discursive possibilities.
The Great Depression and the Rise of Protest Rhetoric
The Wall Street crash of 1929 halted American prosperity and triggered the Great
Depression. The Depression hit African Americans especially hard. The crumbling economy not
only affected blacks economically, but also awakened the scorn of white oppression; starting in
1930, blacks were once again subjected to frequent violence and discrimination. Although the
1932 election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the advent of the New Deal yielded some
improvements for black Americans, by and large, blacks remained constrained by institutional
racism. Some black spokespersons, such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Carter G. Woodson, responded
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to these conditions by formulating anticolonial critiques (Putnam, 2007). Though anticolonial
critiques did not translate into federal programs, the rise of anticolonial discourse signaled
African Americans’ growing concerns with both domestic and international subjugation. The
Depression era also fostered the politicization of black art. With the Harlem Renaissance stifled
by the economic collapse, Chicago became the epicenter of black culture, having its own black
renaissance during the 1930s and 1940s. However, the Chicago artists broke away from Locke’s
program of cultural expressionism, and injected their art with political protest. As black author
Richard Wright (1937/2011a) outlined in “Blueprint for Negro Writing,” the Chicago movement
sought to infuse aesthetics with rhetorical praxis. The Depression era vortex of anticolonial
rhetoric and politically-charged art established protest as a necessary function of black discourse.
Though race relations showed signs of improvement during the 1920s, the onset of the
Depression reignited the flames of white oppression. One compelling example of the decline was
the 1931 case of the “Scottsboro Boys.” While riding a freight train in Alabama, two white
women told police they were raped by several black men (Edgerton, 1994; Hine, Hine, &
Harrold, 2010; Wynn, 2010). Authorities apprehended nine young black youths—between the
ages of 13 and 21—for the charge (Edgerton, 1994). Although the prosecution lacked firm
evidence, the “Scottsboro Boys” were tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the alleged
crime (Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2010). The Supreme Court ultimately exonerated the accused;
however, by the time the conviction was reversed, the innocent “Scottsboro Boys” had
collectively served almost 75 years in prison.
The resurgence of lynching further confirmed the deterioration of race relations. Though
the lynching of blacks had declined during the 1920s, the Depression gave way to 20
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documented lynchings in 1930 and 24 in 1933 (Wynn, 2010). Aside from overt acts of racism,
blacks were also overwhelmed by employment discrimination. Indeed, blacks faced
unemployment at nearly twice the rate of white Americans (Wynn). Though FDR’s New Deal
programs offered blacks some economic opportunities, they still suffered more than white
Americans. According to a 1934 U.S. government survey, while 17 percent of white citizens
could not support themselves, that figure ballooned to 38 percent among blacks (Hine, Hine, &
Harrold, 2010). Edgerton (1994) suggested this condition reflected the “hire last, fire first” policy
which blacks were subjected to during the Depression. According to Wynn (2010), white
workers championed slogans such as “No Jobs for Niggers until Every White Man Has a Job”
and “Niggers Back to the Cotton Fields” (p. 16).
In response to such wage and employment discrimination, Du Bois (1934) proposed a
program based on voluntary self-segregation. Du Bois’ approach supports Putnam’s (2007)
assertion that, during the Depression, the “anticolonial perspective influenced the tenor and focus
of black political culture in the United States” (p. 420). Although Putnam’s analysis illustrated
how black anticolonialism came in response to international exigencies such as the Liberian
labor crisis, or the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Du Bois’ sentiments demonstrate how black
anticolonialism also manifested in rhetoric regarding domestic issues. For, Du Bois’ argument
suggested that blacks would enjoy material gains if they liberated themselves from the system of
white dominance:
It is the race-conscious black man cooperating together in his own institutions and
movements who will eventually emancipate the colored race, and the great step ahead
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today is for the American Negro to accomplish his economic emancipation through
voluntary determined cooperative effort. (p. 400)
However, many black leaders opposed Du Bois’ position, most notably NAACP President
Walter White. In an editorial response, White (1934/2011) rejected Du Bois’ calls for selfsegregation, arguing that blacks must “continue the grim struggle for integration and against
segregation for [their] own physical, moral, and spiritual well-being, for that of white America
and of the world at large” (p. 406, emphasis in original). Still, Du Bois (1935/1995) held firm to
his anticolonial position and ultimately called for blacks to develop “an economic nation within a
nation” (p. 388). Because of his stance, Du Bois was shunned by the NAACP—the organization
which he helped found—and eventually chose to resign as editor of The Crisis.
While Du Bois was primarily concerned with economic liberation, Carter G. Woodson
(1933/2011) suggested African Americans should seek empowerment by reforming the
education system. Woodson critiqued the established curriculum as antiquated and inherently
racist. He maintained the education system benefitted whites more than blacks, “because it [had]
been worked out in conformity to the needs of those who have enslaved and oppressed weaker
peoples” (p. 413). In accordance with Du Bois’ (1935) economic solution, Woodson suggested
that “the Negro … should develop and carry out a program of his own” (Woodson, p. 413). In
Woodson’s assessment, U.S. racial disparities could not be reconciled until blacks escaped the
system which perpetuated their subjugation.
In addition to the ideological shift in black political culture, the Depression also heralded
a shift in black literature. Chicago emerged as the new epicenter of black culture; however, the
Chicago artists rejected the apolitical program popularized by Locke during the Harlem vogue.
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The groups’ ideological differences were evidenced in an exchange between Chicago author
Richard Wright and Harlem author Zora Neale Hurston. In 1937, Wright disparaged Hurston’s
(1937/2006) novel, Their Eyes Were Watching God, for its lack of “a basic idea or theme that
lends itself to significant interpretation” (p. 480). Moreover, Wright criticized Hurston’s
emphasis on the black vernacular, which, in his assessment, caricatured black identity: “Miss
Hurston voluntarily continues in her novel the tradition which was forced upon the Negro in the
theater, that is, the minstrel technique that makes ‘white folks’ laugh” (p. 480, emphasis in
original). Wright concluded that Hurston’s representations of blackness reaffirmed the notion of
whites as “the ‘superior’ race” (p. 481). Hurston (1938/2011) answered Wright’s criticisms by
reviewing his novel Uncle Tom’s Children. Hurston acknowledged Wright’s talent but wondered
“what he would have done had he dealt with plots that touched the broader and more
fundamental phases of Negro life instead of confining himself to the spectacular” (p. 481).
Furthermore, she was confounded by Wright’s puzzling dialect. Hurston closed with the hope
that “Mr. Wright will find in Negro life a vehicle for his talents” (p. 481). The angulation of
Wright (1937/2011a, 1937/2011b) and Hurston’s (1938/2011) respective critiques sheds light on
their ideological differences. Whereas Wright (1937/2011a, 1937/2011b) critiqued political
implications, Hurston (1938/2011) focused on cultural identification.
Wright (1937/2011b) further articulated his perspective in “Blueprint for Negro Writing,”
an essay which delineated principles for black writers who sought to function as political agents.
This political activism differentiated the black writers in the Chicago Renaissance from those in
the Harlem Renaissance. Wright maintained the Chicago writers distinguished themselves by
embracing a new role, one which engaged more meaningful and complex subject matter.
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Reflecting on the new positionality of black writers, Wright lamented that, historically, “Negro
writing has been addressed in the main to a small white audience rather than to a Negro one” (p.
475). Thus, he extended the following question: “Shall Negro writing be for the Negro masses,
moulding [sic] the lives and consciousness of those masses toward new goals, or shall it continue
begging the question of the Negroes’ humanity” (p. 475)? Wright suggested black writers should
be responsible for harnessing the ideologies and attitudes of the masses and then communicating
those sentiments to millions. Moreover, he contended black writers were “being called upon to
do no less than create values by which [the] race is to struggle, live and die” (p. 477). By
establishing political standards for black writing, Wright galvanized black writers around a
collective vision, thus assembling the rhetorical energy of black literature.
During the Great Depression, U.S. race relations deteriorated. Blacks were plagued by
economic discrimination, legal prejudice, and mob violence. Accordingly, black spokespersons
reconfigured their approaches to counter the system of white domination. In the political sphere,
Du Bois and Woodson each utilized anticolonial discourse to critique the system of white
oppression. In the aesthetic sphere, Richard Wright advocated for black writers to infuse their
works with an ideology capable of coordinating the black masses. These related trends
established protest as the primary function of black discourse in the coming years.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Interpreting and analyzing black discourse from the WWII era requires the employment
of a specific theoretical perspective. According to Brummett (2003), in conducting a rhetorical
analysis, theory and method should illuminate specific cases, and should help to illuminate future
rhetorical moments. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, during the early 1900s, black
spokespersons tailored their discourse to the ideological barriers of institutional racism.
Therefore, my analysis is predicated on identifying the ideological patterns within black
discourse from the WWII epoch. Adopting an ideological perspective is constructive. The
perspective permits critics to appreciate how rhetoric is influenced by a myriad of social forces.
In particular, ideographic criticism is well-suited for my purpose. The ideographic approach
allows rhetorical critics to examine how verbal clusters construct and reinforce a society’s
ideology.
An Operational Definition of Ideology
Before I can outline the studies regarding ideological approaches to rhetorical criticism, I
must first explore the concept of ideology, and explain the set of assumptions which inform my
understanding of ideology. First, I acknowledge “ideology” is a highly contested term, which can
shift in meaning according to one’s meta-theoretical perspective. My understanding of ideology
is largely influenced by Althusser’s (1969) framework of ideological state apparatuses (ISAs),
wherein the interests of the ruling class are protected by everyday structures such as politics,
religion, and public discourse.
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According to Belsey (2002), “[i]deology justifies the rule of each ruling class” (p. 32). In
this regard, an ideology reflects the motives of a society’s dominant group and, in turn,
reproduces the systems and structures which provide the dominant group with power. Citing the
works of Marx and Engels, Belsey stated:
in order to represent its own interests as the shared values of all members of the society in
question, the ruling class has to invest its views with the character of inevitability and
convince everyone that these ideas are the only serious option. (p. 32)
This perspective depicts ideology as a sort of false consciousness—a veil which prevents people
from discovering the true reality of their existence. Yet, as Scott (1967) pointed out, in assuming
the existence of a “true reality,” one also views “truth” as an a priori condition. In Scott’s
assessment, within human affairs, truth is always contingent: truth exists in time—“the result of a
process of interaction at a given moment” (p. 13). Moreover, Scott argued “truth must be seen as
dual: the demands of the precepts one adheres to and the demands of the circumstances in which
one must act” (p. 17).
Scott’s (1967) perspective on “truth” is significant to the discussion of ideology because,
his insights illuminate how public opinion is shaped through both systems of belief and lived
experiences. Scott’s position is similar to Althusser’s (1969) contention that ideology possesses a
material existence. In his analysis of ideology, Althusser problematized the notion that ideology
was merely the manifestation of a false consciousness; rather, Althusser asserted that “an
ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices” (p. 90). Unlike the
repressive state apparatus, which is explicitly controlled by the ruling class, Althusser suggested
the interests of the ruling class are also implicitly protected by ISAs. Althusser offered the
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following as examples of ISAs: the educational system, religious institutions, family groups, the
political system, trade-unions, public dialogue, and culture. In light of these ISAs, Althusser
argued all human “practices are inscribed within the material existence of an ideological
apparatus” (p. 91, emphasis in original).
To follow Althusser’s framework, ideology is inescapable: everything humans say or do
is influenced by the materiality of ISAs. And for this reason, it is productive for scholars to
examine the intersections of ideology and rhetoric. For, as Scott (1967) contended, “[i]n human
affairs, … rhetoric … is a way of knowing; it is epistemic” (p. 17). Though absolute truth may be
unattainable, whether because of human error, ideology, or otherwise, rhetoric remains the
human agency for producing and conveying knowledge. Examining the process of such
knowledge production provides scholars with the opportunity to better understand the nature of
human experience.
Mass Consciousness and Rhetorical Theory
The problem of mass consciousness has historically been a focal point of rhetorical
studies (Black, 1970; Bormann, 1972; 1982; Burke, 1969b; McGee, 1975, 1979, 1980, 1987,
1990; Wander, 1984). Especially since the mid-20th century, rhetoricians have sought to
understand the dimensions which simultaneously unite and divide people into various
constituencies (Burke, 1969b; Charland, 1987; Delgado, 1995; Lucaites & Condit, 1990; McGee,
1975, 1979, 1980, 1990; Wander, 1984). With a stockpile of political controversies, civil
struggles, and cultural disputes, the existing literature on mass consciousness has depth. An
essential tenet for much of the scholarship has been theoretical allegiance, in at least some form,
to Burke’s (1969b) paradigm of identification and division.
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Burke (1969a) revolutionized rhetorical criticism by suggesting critics examine how
pentadic terms—act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose—work in hierarchy to create
consubstantiality between rhetor and audience. As one guideline to his approach, Burke called
for examining “the exact relation between ideas and the conditions out of which they arise—or
the other way round, the relation between ideas and conditions which they help to bring about,
when acted upon by human agents” (p. 202, emphasis in original). Upon cursory reading, one
might assume Burke was referring to the concept of ideology. However, throughout his vast
body of research, Burke rarely engaged or even mentioned ideology.
In Rhetoric (1969b), Burke extended an analogous sketch of ideology: “imagination is to
poetry as ideology is to rhetoric” (p. 88). Later in the same volume, he briefly discussed
ideology, but only in two rather trivial ways: (1) how the term had been distorted since Marx and
Engels’ conceptualization and (2) how “ideology” could be synonymized with “terminologies”
(p. 103). Yet, given Burke’s interest with the interaction between “ideas” and “conditions,” one
would expect rhetoricians to be drawn to the concept of ideology. Moreover, if “ideology is to
rhetoric” as “imagination is to poetry,” how could one justify ignoring such an instrumental
force? Accordingly, during the second half of the 20th century, rhetorical scholars engaged mass
consciousness by focusing on the problem of ideology. The works of Black (1970), Bormann
(1972), and Wander (1984), exemplify critical examinations of the intersections between rhetoric
and ideology.
The Problem of Ideology
The concept of “audience” has become a staple in the field of rhetorical criticism. Many
critics concern themselves with analyzing how a rhetor’s discourse sheds light on their intended
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audience. As an outgrowth of these inquiries, Black (1970) suggested a “second persona” was
embedded within rhetorical discourse. He contended the second persona—a silent auditor of the
rhetor’s beliefs and values—was actually a reflection of one’s ideology, or as he put, “the
network of interconnected convictions that functions in a man epistemically and that shape his
identity by determining how he views the world” (p. 112). Black maintained ideology was the
primary force which shaped a person’s identity. In his assessment, since the Reformation, the
West had witnessed a combat of ideologies, each of which generated their own discursive
idioms, affecting the psychological character of their adherents. Thus, understanding the “second
persona” as one’s ideology, might aid the critic in understanding the implications of a given
discourse. From this ideological perspective, Black argued discourses are composed of verbal
tokens, which offer cues to audience members for “how they are to view the world, even beyond
the expressed concerns, the overt propositional sense, of the discourse” (p. 113). Black suggested
a single term or phrase might indicate the ideology which unites rhetor and audience.
Bormann (1972) disapproved of the term “ideology,” largely because of its Marxist
connotations; nonetheless, his fantasy theme approach implicitly engaged ideology. According to
Bormann, fantasy themes emerge from discursive practices in the mass media and mainstream
society, providing communities “with a social reality filled with heroes, villains, emotions, and
attitudes” (p. 398). If these fantasy themes persist, they galvanize in the form of a rhetorical
vision. Then, the subsequent “rhetorical vision is propagated to a larger public until a rhetorical
movement emerges” (p. 399). Bormann examined fantasy themes and rhetorical visions with the
hope of better understanding how human motives are embedded within discourse. His discussion
of motives indirectly engaged the concept of ideology: “When a critic begins … with the
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approach that each rhetorical vision contains as part of its substance the motive that will impel
the people caught up in it, then he can anticipate the behavior of the converts” (p. 407). Such a
characterization sees people divided into discursive communities, each with their own interests,
interests which pervade the community’s words and symbols. Vitally important to Bormann’s
framework, one cannot overlook how these discursive communities are formed: influential
public rhetoric. In this regard, Bormann’s position is similar to Williams’ (1985) conception of
ideology as “the set of ideas which arise from a given set of material interests” (p. 156). Though
Bormann conscientiously avoided discussing ideology, he nonetheless confirmed its influence by
charting the relationship between motives, rhetoric, and social movements.
Wander (1984) contributed to ideological criticism by suggesting the analysis of the third
persona. Ideological criticism, in his view, was defined by the political struggle of engaging “an
historical perspective in relation to cultural artifacts and political issues” (p. 199). As such, when
joined with rhetorical theory, ideological criticism could be harnessed to expose how discourse
was used to rationalize a society’s actions, programs, and silences regarding social and political
issues. Parsing out the third persona requires the critic to engage rhetorical moments of silence
and repression. Not only are audiences identified through the rhetor’s explicit or implicit
summoning, they are also (dis)identified via the absence of reference. Echoing Black’s
approach, Wander maintained that analyzing discourse illustrated “the audience or audiences for
whom the speech had meaning at the moment of utterance” (p. 208). Furthermore, rhetoric
indicates the third persona, the “audiences rejected or negated through the speech and/or the
speaking situation” (p. 209). According to Wander, the negation of these audiences signifies the
rhetor’s beliefs and values. Therefore, differentiating the third persona allows critics to discern
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the “characteristics, roles, actions, or ways of seeing things” (Wander, p. 209) which the rhetor
rejects.
The sketches above demonstrate how the aforementioned scholars engaged the problem
of ideology. Furthermore, one notes how each scholar was influenced by the Burkean (1969b)
paradigm of identification and division. For instance, Black’s (1970) proposal of the second
persona, particularly his assertion that “verbal tokens” contour audience members’ worldviews,
correlates to Burke’s contention that “the basic function of rhetoric [is] the use of words by
human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents” (p. 41). Bormann’s
(1972) insistence that everyday dialogue unites discursive communities through fantasy themes,
reaffirms Burke’s stance that rhetoric should not be conceived of simply as masterful oratory,
“but as a general body of identifications that owe their convincingness” to trivial repetition and
daily reinforcement (p. 26, emphasis in original). Wander’s (1984) conceptualization of the third
persona alludes to a central tenet of Burke’s rhetorical program: the scapegoat. Wander asserted
the third persona, the “being not present,” becomes “equated with disease, a ‘cancer’ called upon
to disfigure an individual or a group” (p. 209). Wander’s characterization reflects Burke’s
(1969a) conviction that “the scapegoat represents the principle of division in that its persecutors
would alienate from themselves to it their own uncleanliness” (p. 406). In sum, Black (1970),
Bormann (1972), and Wander (1984), each expressed adherence to Burke’s (1969b) position that
rhetoric is defined by “the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in
beings that by nature respond to symbols” (p. 43, emphasis in original). Fundamentally,
ideological criticism analyzes how rhetoric and ideology interact to entice symbolic unification
among human agents.
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The Emergence of Michael Calvin McGee
Though each of the aforementioned scholars made significant contributions to ideological
criticism, I am interested in the ideological approach of Michael Calvin McGee. Beginning with
his nuanced conception of “the people,” McGee sought to diverge from neo-Aristotelian methods
by comingling “the notion of ‘the people’ from social theory with the notion of ‘audience’ from
rhetorical theory” (Gess, 1999, p. 13). The result was a problematized conception of mass
consciousness.
McGee (1975) re-conceptualized “the people” with the goal of changing the way
rhetoricians understood audiences. Accordingly, he proceeded with the following question:
“How can one conceive the idea ‘people’ in a way which accounts for the rhetorical function of
‘the people’ in arguments designed to warrant social action, even society itself” (McGee, p.
239)? In other words, how do we dispel the naïve notions of “the people” and replace them with
problematized understandings of how “the people” are symbolically constructed for political
purposes? Following the trajectory of Bormann’s (1972) fantasy theme approach, McGee (1975)
conceded, “‘The People’ may be strictly linguistic phenomena introduced into public argument
as a means of ‘legitimizing’ a collective fantasy” (p. 239, emphasis in original). However, in
McGee’s calculus, “the people” are more accurately a fictive entity, called into rhetorical
existence by an advocate’s appeal to a collective fantasy. “The people,” then, are collectivized
not only through linguistic patterns, but also in response to a mythology. The advocate confronts
their audience with a “battery of entirely personal convictions and opinions … [and] then adapts
them to [their] vision of what a ‘people,’ when created, will want to hear” (McGee, p. 241).
McGee highlighted his departure from Bormann’s (1972) perspective by contending “‘the
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people’ are more process than phenomenon” (McGee, 1975, p. 242, emphasis in original). The
process of transforming a collection of individuals into an individual collection hinges upon “the
people’s” active participation in social and political myths.
McGee’s (1975) perspective of “the people” exhibits how ideology defines “the
parameters of what ‘the people’ of what culture could possibly become” (p. 243). McGee
illuminated how rhetoric and ideology convert individual persons into a collective people. Some
rhetoricians have contested McGee’s reliance upon the audience “in the construction of a text”
(Morris, 2010, p. 23). Yet, others, such as Campbell (1990), have spoken favorably about the
breadth of McGee’s critical program:
History, for McGee, describes a symmetrical rhetorical arc in which a people emerge
from fragments of folk belief and shared experiences and through the narrative skills of a
charismatic leader discover their specific identity through a shared story which undergoes
change and development as different generations adapt it to new circumstances, until the
narrative decays and the People disappear as a self-conscious rhetorical entity. (p. 348)
McGee’s (1975) assertions about “the people” revealed ideology’s role in the rhetoric of social
movements. He would further cement the link between rhetoric and ideology with his conception
of the ideograph.
The Ideograph
McGee contended rhetoric and ideology converge in the form of verbal constructs called
“ideographs.” Ideographs are “summary-terms which permit the mind to grasp in consciousness
a thing which transcends [the] senses” (McGee, 1979, p. 78). In other words, ideographs are
abstract terms or phrases which symbolically reflect a society’s values.
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Examples of salient, American ideographs include: <equality>, <liberty>, and <freedom of
speech>.3 Though ideographs perform various rhetorical functions, three are especially relevant
to my project. First, ideographs induce collective identity. Second, ideographs are rhetorically
efficient. Lastly, ideographs reveal a society’s ideological boundaries.
Historically, political and civic leaders have harnessed ideographs to unite constituents
behind a common ideal. Referencing Burke’s (1969b) framework of identification and
compensatory division, McGee (1980) argued that ideographs “both unite and separate human
beings” (p. 8). Especially in times of crisis or unrest, ideographs become useful for conjuring
and coordinating “the people.” As McGee (1979) explained, ideographs are typically “called
upon by a society’s advocates when it is necessary to collectivize the masses or to legitimize
particular acts of governments” (p. 79). As such, when spokespersons appropriate ideographs in
public discourse, they appeal to collective values and thus mitigate the possibilities for dissent.
However, as McGee pointed out, ideographs would be ineffective if they were merely slogans
for inciting “mass societies into ‘movement’” (McGee, p. 79). Rather, ideographs are effective
because of their usage and existence in real, everyday circumstances. For example, McGee
(1980) demonstrated how some ideographs are “enshrined in the Constitution, some in law, some
merely in conventional usage; but all … [are] … constitutive of ‘the people’” (p. 13).
Fundamentally, ideographs are established according to how aptly they reflect the motives of
“the people.”

3

In accordance with conventional practices (Condit, 1987; Lucaites, 1984), I conform to

the standard of identifying ideographs by placing them in angle brackets (< >).
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Ideographs are rhetorically potent, in part, because they are discursively efficient. As
McGee (1979) asserted, ideographs “are simple, straightforward, and empirically verifiable in
the body of public discourse” (p. 69). For instance, American ideographs (e.g. <equality>,
<liberty>, <freedom of speech>, etc.) are powerful because they frequently occur in political
dialogue. Ideographs, then, must be familiar and relevant to their public—otherwise symbolic
unification will not occur. In this regard, ideographs are similar to Bormann’s (1972, 1982)
“fantasy themes” in the sense that they unite people under a collective vision. Yet, whereas
Bormann suggested fantasy themes are constituted through human dramas, McGee (1979, 1980)
countered that human dramas were derived from discourse, particularly the abstract terminology
of ideographs. In other words, where Bormann (1972, 1982) asserted that discourse reflects a
society’s motives, McGee maintained (1979, 1980) a society’s motives are shaped according to
evocative discursive clusters. Indeed, merely a term or phrase—for instance, <affirmative
action>—can conjure a complex narrative, fraught with competing motives and political
allegiances. Ultimately, though, ideographs gain traction because they function “clearly and
evidently as agents of political consciousness” (McGee, 1980, p. 7). With just a word or phrase,
a rhetor can evoke “the people’s” fundamental beliefs and values.
To reiterate the subtitle of McGee’s (1980) essay: ideographs are the “link between
rhetoric and ideology” (p. 1). More precisely, ideographs are the discursive manifestation of a
society’s ideology. McGee further reasoned that ideographs are “the building blocks … of
ideology” (p. 7). Fundamentally, ideographs are merely “high-order” abstractions; however, their
propensity to “invoke a sense of ‘the people,’” illustrates ideographs are pregnant with symbolic
meaning (p. 15). The connotation of an ideograph can shift according to time and environment,
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thus, the significance of ideographs varies across diachronic and synchronic structures. As
McGee explained, ideographs evolve diachronically—or, across different epochs—and,
therefore, “awareness of the way an ideograph can be meaningful now is controlled in large part
by what it meant then” (pp. 10-11, emphasis in original). Moreover, ideographs are structured
synchronically—or, amongst other clusters of ideographs within a single epoch—and, therefore,
“when we engage ideological argument, when we cause ideographs to do work in explaining,
justifying, or guiding policy in specific situations, the relationship of ideographs changes”
(McGee, p. 13, emphasis in original). Analyzing the usage of ideographs in relation to variables
such as exigency, context, or audience demonstrates how terminologies can foster or reinforce
ideological commitments. As McGee pointed out, “[h]uman beings are ‘conditioned,’ not
directly to belief and behavior, but to a vocabulary of concepts that function as guides, warrants,
reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” (p. 6). <Freedom> provides a compelling example of
the aforementioned phenomenon. For instance, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President
Bush (2001a, 2001b, 2002) repeatedly invoked <freedom> to justify the invasion of Iraq. Four
decades earlier, in his famous “I Have a Dream” address, Martin Luther King Jr. (1963) utilized
<freedom> to argue for African American civil rights. Throughout American history, rhetors
have adopted <freedom> for various political purposes, and while one can question King’s or
Bush’s respective motives for invoking <freedom>, one cannot freely question the principles of
<freedom>. To do so would be to question a pillar of American identity.
Methodological Developments in Ideographic Criticism
Proponents of the ideographic method have developed the ideograph in various
directions. My project is informed by three methodological extensions of the ideographic
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approach. First, Lucaites (1983) showed ideographs perform different types of ideological
functions. Some ideographs generate discursive opportunities and others limit opportunities.
Second, Lucaites and Condit (1990) demonstrated ideographs are polyvalent. Finally, Delgado
(1995) concluded some social movements are constituted through ideographs. Case studies
suggest numerous social movements have been galvanized around ideographs. The insights
indicate the ideographic approach possesses theoretical value.
Lucaites (1983) categorized ideographs according to their ideological function.
Ideological functions arise from a process known as “interpellation,” in which an ideology
simultaneously “creates or enables possibilities (forms of thinking and modes of acting) while
constraining other possibilities” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 314). Lucaites (1983) argued ideographs
function substantively when they possess “intrinsic values for a particular ideological
community” (p. 286). For instance, in American society, <equality> functions substantively,
because even though <equality> does not possess a material value, Americans’ still inherently
value <equality>. Ideographs function regulatively when they generate equilibrium between
conflicting substantive ideographs (Lucaites). For example, prior to the Voting Rights Act of
1965, a disconnect existed between the substantive ideographs <equality> and <democracy>;
one’s degree of civic participation was pre-determined by race. However, since the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was signed into <law>, the conflict between <equality> and <democracy>
has been reconciled by the regulative ideograph <rule of law>. Lucaites elucidated his
conception of substantive and regulative ideographs by surveying the development of ideographs
in the Anglo-American Whig tradition. He justified his framework on the grounds that tracing
ideographic functions helps “to direct our attention to the point(s) at which ideological
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dislocations occur” (p. 299). Lucaites’ framework explains how, in specific synchronous
moments, ideographs are organized into hierarchies. Analyzing the interplay between substantive
and regulative ideographs demonstrates how an ideograph’s potency hinges upon both material
conditions and symbolic structures.
Lucaites and Condit (1990) advanced the ideographic construct by illustrating how
rhetors could appropriate ideographs for both culturetypal and counter-cultural purposes.
Lucaites and Condit identified <equality> as the primary ideograph in African American civil
rights discourse. They examined <equality> by juxtaposing rhetorical texts from Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Malcolm X. Through ideographic analysis, Lucaites and Condit concluded that,
although King and Malcolm X each centered their rhetorical programs on <equality>, they
articulated different visions of <equality>. For example, whereas King situated <equality> within
the parameters of biblical teachings, Malcolm X positioned <equality> as a signifier of social
power (Lucaites & Condit). King’s version of <equality> was culturetypal because he conformed
to “culturally authorized characterizations and narratives” (Lucaites & Condit, p. 14). Malcolm
X’s version of <equality>, however, was counter-cultural, because he challenged and redefined
the dominant conceptions of <equality> (Lucaites & Condit). Building upon McGee’s (1980)
assertion that diachronic analysis—analysis across epochs—revealed shifts in ideographic
meanings, Lucaites and Condit (1990) illustrated how ideographs could possess dynamic
meanings even within a specific epoch. Overall, Lucaites and Condit showed how ideographs
vary according to rhetorical styles, material conditions, and symbolic environments.
Delgado (1995) examined how ideographs influence the constitution of social
movements. Citing Chicano rhetoric as a textual example, Delgado maintained critics could gain
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a fuller understanding of movement rhetoric by tracing how movements utilized ideographs.
Delgado’s conception of constitutive ideographs was informed by Charland’s (1987)
understanding of constitutive rhetoric. Following Burke (1969b) and McGee (1975), Charland
(1987) contended one’s subjectivity was prior to persuasion, because one must already exist as
an interpellated subject within an ideology before acts of persuasion can occur. In other words,
persuasive discourse requires an audience comprised of individuals whose identities have already
been contoured by the ideological conditions of their community. Viewing ideographs from a
constitutive frame, Delgado (1995) surmised “the use of ideographs extends beyond the state and
contains cultural meanings that can invite opposition to the state” (p. 447). Thus, Delgado
concluded “ideographs allow for political struggle among competing elements and contestations
between dominant and non-dominant groups” (p. 447).
Applications of Ideographic Criticism
Rhetorical critics have employed ideographic criticism to analyze how ideographs have
affected public communication in specific political and cultural contexts. The case studies
outlined below indicate the ideographic method has proven effective in tracing linkages between
a society’s discourse and its ideology. Furthermore, the studies below demonstrate ideographic
criticism can be harnessed to better understand a society’s ideological boundaries.
McGee (1987) employed the ideographic method to analyze the ideograph <people>. He
conducted his analysis by examining the subtle difference between the Soviet characterization of
the plural <peoples> and the American characterization of the singular <people>. McGee argued
the subtle distinction signified ideological differences between Soviets and Americans;
specifically, he maintained the distinction conveyed Soviets’ preference for collectivity and
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Americans’ preference for individuality. Furthermore, he believed the American preference for
the singular <people> signaled Americans’ preference for “cultural and political homogeneity”
(McGee, p. 434). McGee illustrated the homogenizing effect by showing how, just as minority
groups began to establish the plural sense of <peoples>, Americans started to supplant
<people(s)> with <public>. In McGee’s calculus, the shift toward <public> served to structure
silences because it weakened the linkages between <sovereignty> and <equality>. He
illuminated his argument by explaining how American <popular sovereignty> equates to <equal
opportunity>, not <political representation>. For example, the singular <public> “permits
Chicano participation in the political process … but in no way respects Chicano <sovereignty>
(by anticipating that Chicanos should be represented in Congress in proportion to their numbers,
for example)” (McGee, p. 435). Ultimately, McGee’s analysis demonstrated how ideographs can
produce criterion for evaluating if persons or groups meet the homogenous standards of the
<people>.
Delgado (1999) harnessed the ideograph to examine Cuban leader Fidel Castro’s use of
ideographs in his 1961 address “Words to the Intellectuals.” Delgado identified <revolution> as
the central ideograph in Castro’s speech. Furthermore, he contended Castro’s use of ideographs
marked a strategic move to “reconstitute an identity for artists and writers so that they could
recognize themselves inside of, and be affirmed by, the revolution” (Delgado, p. 10). Delgado
concluded such rhetorical tactics functioned as part of a larger rhetorical scheme to forge “a new
Cuban ideology and identity” (p. 10). Moreover, Delgado’s insight that Castro repositioned
<revolution> by relating <revolution> to ideographs such as <justice>, <equality>, and
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<stability>, illustrates how ideographs derive their meaning from their interaction with clusters
of other ideographs.
Cloud (2004) applied the ideographic method to study visual representations of Afghan
women in Time magazine. She argued Afghan women were depicted in ways that reinforced the
ideograph <clash of civilizations>, an attitude which insists “the United States and its people
face an incontrovertible conflict with Others, particularly Islamic Others, whose civilizations are
inferior and hostile to Western capitalism” (Cloud, p. 286). In Cloud’s assessment, such
representations served to reify the Western attitude of the <white man’s burden>. Through a
procedure of linked verbal and visual ideographic analyses, Cloud showed how the depictions of
Afghan women, coupled with the prevailing American ideographs <clash of civilizations> and
<white man’s burden>, served to stratify notions of self and Other. Cloud maintained the
dichotomy promoted the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Cloud’s study exemplified how ideographs simultaneously unite and divide
people, and in so doing, induce cooperation by demarcating lines of ideological difference.
Powell (2008) utilized the ideographic method to investigate the rhetorical efficacy of
The Covenant with Black America, a manifesto in which black intellectuals Tavis Smiley, Cornel
West, and Eddie Claude, Jr. outlined a new vision of <equality> for African Americans. Powell
sought to explain and evaluate how The Covenant’s “notions of equality … related[d] to Black
and African Americans and their relationship(s) with other race-based minority groups and
dominant White America” (p. 4). In order to illuminate how The Covenant characterized
<equality>, Powell performed both diachronic and synchronic analyses of <equality>. To
perform the diachronic analysis, he drew upon Lucaites and Condit’s (1990) conclusions from
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their ideographic study of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X. Powell (2008) drew parallels
between the rhetorical dynamic between King and Malcolm X (culturetypal vs. counter-cultural)
to the rhetorical environment between black spokespersons Reverend Jesse Jackson and Minister
Louis Farrakhan. Then, for the synchronic analysis, Powell analyzed how traces of both Jackson
and Farrakhan’s characterizations of <equality> could be found in The Covenant. Ultimately,
Powell concluded The Covenant overemphasized Farrakhan’s counter-cultural version of
equality, and such oppositional rhetoric served to widen the chasm between white and black
Americans. Powell’s inquiry elucidated how, in synchronous moments, ideographs can be
appropriated for competing political demands. Moreover, he demonstrated ideographic potency
hinges upon how closely an ideograph aligns to its historical characterizations.
Miller and Murray (2008) used the ideographic method to explore how ideographs
influenced abstinence-only sex education discourse. They argued the deployment of <Purity>
and its “shadow-ideograph” <Taint> created a rhetorical landscape in which abstinence-only
education was the only moral approach to sex education (Miller & Murray, p. 2). Miller and
Murray stated that while <Purity> was prevalent throughout abstinence-only discourse, <Taint>
did not manifest materially and thus did not meet the standard criterion of an ideograph.
However, their analysis demonstrated that by functioning implicitly, <Taint> still had a real
impact on sex-education discourse. Miller and Murray concluded: “The social outcome of this
ideographic combination is the emergence of a rhetorical climate where it is exceedingly difficult
to defend comprehensive sex education and birth control without completely rejecting almost
universally-accepted social values and concomitant fears” (p. 6). Their analysis of <Purity> and
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<Taint> exemplified how ideographs, whether materially present or implied, configure a
discourse community’s ideological boundaries.
Critiques of the Ideograph
Developments in postmodernist thought have led to rethinking the epistemological and
ontological foundations of various rhetorical theories and methods. The postmodern condition
marks a break from the Enlightenment vision of isolated thinkers working out problems in
solitude (Lucaites, 1998). Postmodernity, rather, compels scholars to recognize polysemic
qualities and acknowledge multiplicity within spheres of influence, publics, and identities. As
Sekimoto (2011) elucidated, the postmodern condition, even the previously unproblematic
concept of “identity,” must be re-conceptualized “not only as a composition of relatively fixed
categories [epistemology] but also a process and condition of being and becoming [ontology]”
(p. 48). In short, postmodernity has resulted in a fluidity of meaning. Lucaites (1998) discussed
how such fluidity affects rhetorical theory:
To theorize in the postmodern condition is not to solve social and political problems
once and for all, but to approach them as they exist in all of their contingency and
particularity—to treat their material presence symbolically and creatively, with and
among one another as individuals-in-community. (p. 20)
Lucaites’ emphasis on “individuals-in-community” exemplifies how postmodernity has
disintegrated “grand political and social designs” (Delgado, Deluca, & Janas, 1993, p. 259). To
negotiate the postmodern condition, then, rhetorical scholars must develop strategies which
expose “important sites of struggle and dispute outside as well as inside the academic world”
(Delgado, Deluca, & Janas, p. 260).
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Opponents of McGee’s ideograph have critiqued and amended various dimensions of the
construct. The criticisms outlined below display the tension which exists between the ideograph
and postmodernism. In many ways, the fragmentation of contemporary culture (McGee, 1990)
has debunked notions of a totalizing ideology (Saindon, 2008), thus questioning the legitimacy
of the ideograph.
In response to society’s transition into “postmodernity,” McGee (1990) revisited his
rhetorical program and encouraged rhetoricians to adopt more critical methods. Whereas McGee
previously theorized rhetoric in terms of totalizing ideological forces, he broke from the position
by contending society had become socially and culturally fragmented and was thus impervious to
homogenous rhetoric (McGee, 1990). McGee rejected the term “rhetorical criticism,” believing
the term relegated rhetoric to an adjectival state and assumed the existence of a homogenous
audience. 4 In place of rhetorical criticism, he aligned with McKerrow’s (1989) conception of
“critical rhetoric.” By adopting “rhetoric” as a master term instead of “criticism,” McGee argued
(1990) rhetoricians would begin to notice how “rhetors make discourses from scraps and pieces
of evidence” (p. 279, emphasis in original). McGee elaborated on the fragmentation of
postmodernity by suggesting discourses must be analyzed according to three structural
relationships: source, culture, and influence. While “source” and “culture” are comparable to the
ideographic variables “diachronic” and “synchronic,” McGee’s (1990) postmodern emphasis on
4

McGee (1990) argued the term “rhetorical criticism” emphasized “criticism” instead of

“rhetoric.” In so doing, rhetorical speech acts became conflated with the study of rhetorical
criticism. McGee argued, in its adjectival state, rhetoric is dissociated from public discourse and
instead synonymized with acts of interpretation.
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“influence” implies fragments gain rhetorical force according to their distribution and
duplication: “The public’s business is now being done more often via direct mail, television
spots, documentaries, mass entertainment, and ‘quotable quotes’ on the evening news than
through the more traditional media” (McGee, p. 286).5 McGee’s critical turn merged context into
text and dislodged the linkage between ideographs and audiences.
McGee’s (1990) fragmentation thesis highlighted the rhetorical complexities of the
postmodern condition. Subsequent studies (Saindon, 2008; Swenson, 2008) have sought to refit
the ideograph to the social and cultural demands of postmodernity. Saindon (2008) staged a
debate between McGee’s ideograph and fragment theories. Saindon proposed the two theories be
fused into the singular construct “ideographic fragment” (p. 88). Saindon found merit with both
of McGee’s approaches, citing the ideograph’s faculty to illuminate asymmetrical power
relations, and the fragment’s capacity to account for unstable meta-narratives. Saindon
contended that adopting the ideographic fragment as an object of inquiry reorients the emphasis
of rhetorical studies. Instead of understanding discourse as an index of cultural domination,
critical rhetoricians could reestablish the significance of motives and examine how, in the face of
increasing cultural fragmentation, discourse generates social cohesion. Overall, Saindon claimed
supplanting the ideograph with the ideographic fragment illuminates why some discourse
fragments resonate while others do not.

5

McGee’s (1990) characterization of new media is outdated; in contemporary culture,

“the public’s business is being done” (p. 285) via e-mail, cellular text messages, Facebook,
Twitter, 24-hour television coverage, and the Internet.
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During the mid-20th century, poststructuralists insisted on the arbitrariness of signs,
contending textual meanings varied from one audience to the next (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001).
Swenson (2008) adapted McGee’s ideograph to the tenets of poststructuralism. In Swenson’s
assessment, a poststructuralist reading of the ideograph was fruitful because it repositioned “the
ideograph not as a unifying principle, but as a rhetorical strategy that seeks to obscure and
exclude” (p. 3). Swenson critiqued the ideograph for its reliance upon “a system of dualities that
make partial truths … into covering laws” (p. 8). As such, he maintained a poststructuralist
reading problematized the ideograph’s assumption of mass consciousness. Swenson asserted
McGee’s conception of the ideograph was flawed because it relied upon the “connection
between a single signifier and system of belief” (p. 12). Swenson concluded a poststructuralist
reading of the ideograph re-centered analysis within a specific text, and helped to liberate those
who were marginalized by the ideograph.
Method
In Chapter Four, I utilize the ideographic method to analyze African American rhetoric
from the WWII era. My study is centered on the synchronic interplay of ideographs within the
context of U.S. discourse during WWII. Drawing upon the theoretical, methodological, and
critical insights of ideograph scholars, I have devised a method which satisfies the aims of the
project. My procedure can be delineated into the following parts: the identification of
ideographs, the interpretation of ideograph clusters, and the analysis of ideograph appropriation.
First, ideograph identification requires the critic to read texts and distinguish ideographs
as they emerge. As Jasinski (2001) pointed out, a specific measure does not exist for identifying
ideographs; rather, a critic must identify ideographs according to their function within text and
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context. Therefore, I will identify ideographs according to their textual frequency, argumentative
potency, and emotional intensity. I acknowledge the subjectivity of the process; however, the
advantage of the ideographic method is that the critic’s insights are based upon the material
existence of ideographs within texts. In this way, the critic’s analysis is predicated upon
empirical, discursive formations.
Second, as McGee (1980) contended, ideographs derive their meaning from within
clusters of other ideographs. As such, the critic must discern if the invocation of ideographs
naturally elicits other ideographs within the text. Extending from Burke’s (1969a) notion of
pentadic ratios, I evaluate how clusters of ideographs function hierarchically.
Finally, in accordance with Lucaites and Condit’s (1990) approach, I differentiate
between culturetypal and counter-cultural characterizations of ideographs. Examining the
relationship between culturetypal and counter-cultural ideographs provides a comprehensive
understanding of how ideology and rhetoric share a reciprocal relationship. To do so, I evaluate
whether a spokesperson’s ideographic invention reflects or reinvents the culture’s ideological
expectations.
Though I utilize the ideographic method, I remain cognizant of the critiques of the
approach (McGee, 1990; McKerrow, 1989; Saindon, 2008; Swenson, 2008). My procedure
addresses those critiques by incorporating methodological extensions of the ideograph construct
which adapt the approach to better account for the cultural and social fragmentation within
postmodernity. In using ideographic criticism, I aim to illustrate how ideology influenced the
rhetoric of black spokespersons during the WWII era.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I examine two related trends within U.S. public discourse from the WWII
era. In general, I survey how U.S. officials and African American spokespersons both shaped
their wartime discourses around ideographs. In particular, I focus on how black author, Ralph
Ellison, challenged the rhetoric of U.S. officials in his wartime editorials. First, I explore how
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1941) utilized ideographs in “The Four Freedoms.” Second, I
chart how Roosevelt’s ideographic commitments were advanced further in three wartime
addresses by Under-secretary Sumner Welles. Third, I investigate three editorials by Ellison,
focusing on how his ideographic usage diverged from Roosevelt’s. Finally, I examine the
ideographic discrepancies between Roosevelt’s “The Four Freedoms” and Ellison’s reinvention
of <The Four Freedoms>.Posed with the demands of WWII, U.S. officials asked Americans to
sacrifice personal agendas in the name of <national security> and <freedom>. The ideological
commitments of the epoch subordinated all other domestic concerns to the primacy of the war
effort. At the same time, African Americans remained constrained by institutional racism and
Jim Crow segregation. Even with the federal government pressing hard for Americans to enlist in
the armed forces, able-bodied black soldiers were relegated to performing menial tasks within
segregated units (Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2010). In the civic sphere, the presence of the war
effort—and its demands for <unity> and <patriotism>—stymied black spokespersons’ efforts to
eradicate institutional racism. Overt criticism of the war effort carried serious repercussions.
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According to Gates and Burton (2011), even those who simply voiced their dissent ran the risk of
being arrested.
Though scholars have attended to the rhetorical foundations and appropriations of WWII
(Balthrop, Blair, & Michel, 2010; Biesecker, 2002; Brands, 2005; Hunt, 1943; Olson, 1983), the
intersections of race and wartime discourse remain understudied. Specifically, scholars have
neglected to examine how black spokespersons continued to pursue civil rights in spite of the
state-sanctioned ideological commitments which precluded protest. To better examine these
issues I analyze Ralph Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) wartime editorials from
the black periodical The Negro Quarterly: A Review of Negro Life and Culture. Ellison, who
would later author the critically acclaimed novel Invisible Man, was one of the most promising
black authors and literary critics during the WWII era. His editorials provide fitting texts for
exploring the rhetorical and ideological complexities which faced black spokespersons during
the epoch.
In order to critique the racial hypocrisy of U.S. and Allied forces, I contend Ellison
negotiated the ideological boundaries of the wartime context. Drawing upon the cultural
currency generated by President Roosevelt’s (1941) “The Four Freedoms” address, Ellison
utilized <The Four Freedoms> as a vehicle for reframing the aims of the U.S. and Allied war
effort. First, I argue Ellison utilized a series of ideographs to reinvent the meaning of <The Four
Freedoms>. Second, I contend Ellison’s ideographic reinvention constituted a counter-cultural
appropriation of <The Four Freedoms>, which served to highlight how domestic <fascism>
undermined the tenets of <The Four Freedoms>. Finally, I demonstrate how Ellison’s
reinvention of <The Four Freedoms> served to contest the dominant ideology’s insistence on
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preserving <freedom> and, instead, advocated a program which emphasized liberating
dispossessed <peoples>. Ellison’s accent on <liberty> reflected the political, social, and
economic inequity which stifled African Americans and colonial <peoples> throughout the
world during the era.
“The Four Freedoms”
On January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt delivered the State of the Union Address under
the heading “The Four Freedoms.” The address responded to the intensifying conflict of WWII
in Europe. As a remedy for the conflict, Roosevelt presented “four essential human freedoms”:
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear (para. 5458). The U.S. had not yet entered WWII at the time of the address; however, “The Four
Freedoms” suggested foreign <tyranny> jeopardized the basic principles of American life.
Roosevelt exploited that anxiety to emphasize collective values such as <freedom> and
<security>. In appealing to collective values, Roosevelt established stringent demands for
<patriotism> and <unity>, thus, limiting the range of acceptable civic attitudes and behaviors.
Overall, Roosevelt’s coordinated appeal to collective values and civic duties imposed an
homogenous conception of <American> identity. In so doing, Roosevelt reinforced the values of
the dominant ideology and discouraged dissent from non-dominant groups.
In “The Four Freedoms,” Roosevelt (1941) juxtaposed the warring ideals of <tyranny>
and <freedom>. By staging the contest between <tyranny> and <freedom>, he emphasized how
Americans must commit energy and resources to <security>. First, though, Roosevelt had to
establish a threat which warranted a national commitment to <security>. Thus, he illustrated how
America’s <freedom> was being threatened by tyrannical, foreign dictators. Referencing Hitler’s
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Nazi regime in Germany, Roosevelt declared, “[T]he new order of tyranny seeks to spread over
every continent today” (para. 9). His description positioned <tyranny> as an imminent threat
which, if left unchecked, could conquer the American people. Roosevelt’s reference to
<tyranny> provided him the leverage to impose an essentialized concept of American character:
“The American people have unalterably set their faces against that tyranny” (para. 9). Roosevelt
characterized <tyranny> as an unequivocal evil. In so doing, he offered a rhetorical devil which
Americans could universally unite against. Roosevelt’s usage of <tyranny> implored Americans
to transcend their collective differences and, instead, unify around common ideals. Calling upon
<tyranny> enabled Roosevelt to sketch an uncomplicated, homogenous portrait of American
identity which, in turn, rhetorically eschewed the hegemonic structures which synchronously
tyrannized U.S. cultural minorities.
Roosevelt (1941) countered <tyranny> with the American commitment to <freedom>.
“The Four Freedoms” gain their ideographic force from their foundation in the customary
ideograph <freedom>. Roosevelt contended <tyranny> must be combatted with “four essential
freedoms”:
The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in
the world.
The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its
inhabitants—everywhere in the world.
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The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a worldwide
reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will
be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere
in the world. (para. 55-58)
“The Four Freedoms” encompass both positive and negative rights. For instance, whereas
Roosevelt’s first <freedom> is “freedom of speech and expression” (para. 55, emphasis added),
his third <freedom> is “freedom from want” (para. 57, emphasis added). While the first two
<freedoms> express desirable conditions, the last two <freedoms> convey conditions which
must be prevented. This move metonymically reduces <freedom> to the principles of American
life. Indeed, Roosevelt’s delineation of “The Four Freedoms” grounded the ideal of <freedom>
in distinctly American terms, linking <freedom> to political, religious, economic, and social
conditions which echo historic American values. Roosevelt further contracted <freedom>
through rhetorical invention: “This nation has placed its destiny in the hands and heads and
hearts of its millions of free men and women, and its faith in freedom under the guidance of God.
Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere” (para. 62). Projecting the U.S. as
the embodiment of <freedom>, Roosevelt harnessed America’s religious mythology to associate
<freedom> with the divine wisdom of God. By posturing <freedom> as a divine right, bestowed
upon humans by God, Roosevelt positioned the “The Four Freedoms” as a set of unalienable
principles on par with the country’s Founders’ commitment to <life>, <liberty>, and the <pursuit
of happiness>. In essence, Roosevelt reduced <freedom> to the political example of America,
thus impelling other nations to follow the American model. Ironically, such an exceptionalist
attitude conveyed a sense of national supremacy not all that dissimilar from Nazi Germany.
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However, Roosevelt circumnavigated such trappings by linking <freedom> with human rights
everywhere. Nonetheless, Roosevelt’s ideographic usage reduced <freedom> to the example of
U.S. democracy, which established Americans as the physical embodiment of <freedom>.
“The Four Freedoms” address exudes both urgency and solemnity. The speech is both
deliberative and epideictic in the sense that Roosevelt (1941) called for future political actions by
championing historic struggles and accomplishments (Aristotle, c. 350 BC/2007). He captured
such a tone, in part, by linking <freedom> to <security>. Indeed, Roosevelt (1941) harnessed
“The Four Freedoms” to convince Americans that if they wished to protect their <freedom> from
<tyranny>, they must become committed to <security>. Although “The Four Freedoms” were
the central theme of the address, Roosevelt’s arrangement of the text oriented the audience to
perceive domestic <security> as the logical defender of “The Four Freedoms.” For instance,
Roosevelt opened the oration by stressing the urgency of the moment:
I address you, the members of this new Congress, at a moment unprecedented in the
history of the union. I use the word “unprecedented” because at no previous time has
American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today. (para. 1)
Roosevelt appealed to <security> by juxtaposing the present danger with the exigencies of the
past. Although, historically, the U.S. had engaged in other wars with foreign powers, Roosevelt
maintained, “[I]n no case had a serious threat been raised against [America’s] national safety or
… continued independence” (para. 3). Later in the speech, Roosevelt shifted the emphasis of
<security> by pledging American support to those nations and peoples who had resisted the
aggression of the Axis Powers. Roosevelt asserted, “By this support we express our
determination that the democratic cause shall prevail, and we strengthen the defense and the
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security of our own nation” (para. 22). Thus, Roosevelt associated <security> with the
preservation of <freedom>. Linking <security> and <freedom> provided Roosevelt with enough
leverage to even justify Congressional confidentiality and demand increased production of war
materials. Moreover, by drawing the link between <security> and <freedom>, Roosevelt
proposed a logical framework wherein U.S. <freedom> hinged upon devotion to <security>.
Thus, protesting the aims of wartime <security> measures was equivalent to denouncing the
principles of <freedom>. This ideological landscape is significant because the pressures to
preserve <freedom> squelched the potential for dissent from other state policies. In turn, the
emphasis on <security> largely precluded non-dominant groups from critiquing civil injustices.
With <security> established as the essential defender of <freedom>, Roosevelt (1941)
commanded allegiance to <security> measures by appealing to <patriotism> and <unity>. In
particular, he used enthymematic logic to cultivate a terrain wherein one’s dedication to
<freedom> hinged upon their performance of <patriotism> and <unity>. Roosevelt expressed
<patriotism> in two distinct forms: (1) an agency which combats disloyalty and (2) a purpose for
which Americans should strive (Burke, 1969a). Roosevelt (1941) discussed how, in trying times,
<Americans> would be expected to make sacrifices, and the most effective way to deal with the
“slackers” and “trouble-makers” who were unwilling to make such sacrifices was “to shame
them by patriotic example” (para. 45). Roosevelt did not delineate any specific qualities of
<patriotism>; rather, he ambiguously offered <patriotism> as an agency for vanquishing
“unpatriotic” dissidents. In so doing, Roosevelt limited <American> identity by suggesting those
who were not overtly nationalistic must be overwhelmed by the force of <patriotism>. In other
words, Roosevelt discouraged dissent from state policies. Finally, Roosevelt positioned
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<patriotism> as an indicator of integrity. He alluded to future programs needed to satisfy the
aims of “The Four Freedoms”; however, such programs would require tax increases. To
minimize negative reactions to his proposals, Roosevelt employed <patriotism> to reinforce his
homogenous vision of <American> identity. Roosevelt maintained that if Congress upheld the
principles of “The Four Freedoms,” <Americans> would put “patriotism ahead [of]
pocketbooks” (para. 53). Ultimately, Roosevelt’s usage of <patriotism> forged a link between
<American> identity and utilitarianism. Thus, the emphasis on <patriotism> served the interests
of the politically and materially privileged.
Roosevelt (1941) deployed <unity> to further sketch the link between <American>
identity and <security>. Specifically, he portrayed <unity> as an innate <American> quality.
Roosevelt’s discourse implied <American> citizenship was not defined by geographical
boundaries; rather, <American> identity stemmed from one’s personal character, particularly,
their commitment to live in <unity> with other <Americans>. In the beginning of the speech,
Roosevelt asserted the Civil War was the only domestic crisis to ever threaten U.S. <unity>.
Then, Roosevelt harnessed the rhetorical capital of the Civil War to suggest, in the modern era,
<Americans> possessed a natural propensity for <unity>: “Today, thank God, 130,000,000
Americans in 48 States have forgotten points of the compass in our national unity” (para. 2). By
subjugating a history of conflict and difference to an innate quality of <American> identity,
Roosevelt normalized <unity> as the natural condition of U.S. society, thus, leveraging minority
opinions to conform to the dominant majority. Roosevelt further appealed to mainstream
positions by suggesting subversives were actively spreading “poisonous propaganda … to
destroy unity and promote discord” (para. 10). Roosevelt’s characterization is significant
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because, in linking “discord” with “poisonous propaganda,” he conflated dissent with
subversion. Whereas subversives seek to overthrow a government, dissidents merely deviate
from state positions. This move circumscribed <American> identity to accordance with state
views. In the final section of the address, Roosevelt declared the U.S. derived its strength from
<unity>: “Our strength is our unity of purpose” (para. 62). In sum, Roosevelt argued
<Americans> derived their power from their coordinated commitments to <freedom>,
<security>, <patriotism>, and <unity>.
In “The Four Freedoms,” Roosevelt (1941) harnessed the threat of <tyranny> to arouse
wartime anxieties. In so doing, he questioned the efficacy of U.S. <security>, which, in turn,
questioned the future of U.S. <freedom>. Roosevelt then appealed to those fears to craft an
ideological landscape wherein one’s <American> identity hinged upon their allegiance to
<patriotism> and <unity>. In sum, by grounding <freedom> in civic commitments to
<patriotism> and <unity>, Roosevelt reinforced the authority of mainstream opinions. Moreover,
Roosevelt’s ideographic usage imposed a homogenous conception of <American> identity which
discouraged deviation from state positions. This ideological climate impeded cultural minorities
from protesting political, social, and economic inequities.
Sumner Welles and the Expansion of “The Four Freedoms”
The ideographic commitments which Roosevelt (1941) outlined in “The Four Freedoms”
gained force as they were further expounded by other public figures. One such public figure was
Sumner Welles. Welles served as the Under Secretary of State in the Roosevelt Administration
during WWII. During his tenure as Under Secretary, Welles delivered various addresses to both
domestic and foreign audiences. It is worthwhile to note how, after Roosevelt’s delivery of “The
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Four Freedoms,” Welles’ speeches reflected the president’s ideographic commitments to
<freedom> and <security>. As such, I examine Welles’ (1941/1943a, 1941/1943b, 1942/1943c)
ideographic usage from three noteworthy speeches: “An Association of Nations,” “Wilson and
the Atlantic Charter,” and “The Realization of a Great Vision.” By further emphasizing the link
between <freedom> and <security>, Welles reinforced Roosevelt’s argument that Americans
must capitulate to the requirements of the state and, thus, support the war effort.
On July 22, 1941, Welles delivered a speech titled “An Association of Nations” at the
dedication to the new wing of the Norwegian Legation in Washington, D.C. The address came
after Norway had been stripped of its independence by Nazi Germany. In the speech, Welles
celebrated America’s historic relationship with Norway, and declared U.S. support to Norway’s
struggle for <freedom> against Nazi Germany. Moreover, Welles proclaimed, “[I]n a larger
sense, these ceremonies constitute an act of faith in the ultimate victory of the forces of human
liberty, in the triumph of civilization itself over the forces of barbarism” (p. 12). In this regard,
the material presence of Norway functioned as a synecdochal reference to the threat of
<tyranny>. Welles reminded the audience such threats could not be overcome until Hitler was
removed from power. Still, Welles professed his confidence “that the cause of liberty and of
freedom [would] not go down to defeat” (p. 12). However, he qualified his conviction with the
stipulation that free people must now dedicate all their energy and resources to the cause of
victory. Americans, Welles contended, were particularly responsible for facilitating “an
association of nations through which the freedom, the happiness, and the security of all peoples
may be achieved” (p. 15). Finally, Welles closed by reflecting on the necessity of <security>:
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That word, security, represents the end upon which the hearts of men and women
everywhere today are set. Whether it be security from bombing from the air, or from
mass destruction; whether it be security from want, disease, and starvation; whether it be
security in enjoying inalienable rights which every human being should possess of living
out his life in peace and happiness, people throughout the length and breadth of the world
are demanding security, and freedom from fear. (p. 15).
In sum, Welles utilized the material presence of Norway’s subjugation to conjure the threat of
<tyranny> which lurked in Nazi German. Then, following Roosevelt’s (1941) logic, Welles
(1941/1943a) crafted an appeal which coordinated <freedom> and <security>.
On Armistice Day, November 11, 1941, Welles celebrated the memory of late President
Woodrow Wilson by delivering an address at the Washington Cathedral titled “Wilson and the
Atlantic Charter.” Using the memory of President Wilson as rhetorical capital, Welles glorified
Wilson’s (1917) WWI-commitment to make the world “safe for democracy” (para. 35). In
Welles’ assessment (1941/1943b), the current war placed the U.S. in even greater peril than
WWI. As such, Welles acknowledged the possibility for U.S. entry into the war, contending if
foreign aggressors prevailed, there would be no place “for the freedoms which [Americans]
cherish and … are passionately determined to maintain” (p. 29). Anticipating the possibility of
foreign aggression, Welles argued Americans must dedicate themselves to principles which he
described as even “more dear … than life itself”: namely, “preserving the freedom of the United
States and … safeguarding the independence of the American people” (p. 30). Welles’
characterization is significant because he placed a greater value on principles, such as <freedom>
and <security>, than on actual human <life>. Welles closed by echoing the principles of “The
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Four Freedoms,” arguing Hitler’s goal was to destroy <security> and to annihilate religious,
political, and economic <liberty> across the globe. Again, Welles exploited Americans’ fear of
<tyranny> to draw a logical link between <freedom> and <security>.
On Memorial Day, May 30, 1942, at the Arlington National Amphitheatre, Welles
delivered an address titled “The Realization of a Great Vision.” In general, Welles used the
speech to highlight how America’s historic dedication to <security> provided the current
generation with the <freedom> they enjoyed. Welles emphasized the importance of <security>
by “paying tribute to the memories of those who have made the ultimate sacrifice for their
country and for their fellow men” (p. 66). Similar to Roosevelt’s (1941) appeal in “The Four
Freedoms,” Welles (1942/1943c) commemorated the Civil War to underscore the importance of
<unity>. Furthermore, he used the example of the Civil War to illustrate how even great conflict
could not dislodge Americans’ commitment to <freedom>. Ultimately, Welles concluded
Americans must “secure the future safety of their country and of its free institutions and help the
nations of the earth back into the paths of peace” (p. 75). Accordingly, Welles linked <security>
to the preservation of U.S. <freedom>, and argued Americans had a responsibility to foster
<freedom> throughout the world.
Welles’ (1941/1943a, 1941/1943b, 1942/1943c) usage of <freedom> and <security> in
the aforementioned speeches echo the ideographic cluster which Roosevelt (1941) charted in
“The Four Freedoms.” By expressing allegiance to “The Four Freedoms,” Welles advocated that
<freedom> was grounded in a commitment to <security>. Furthermore, by conforming to “The
Four Freedoms,” Welles advanced Roosevelt’s stringent demands for <patriotism> and <unity>,
thus, perpetuating Roosevelt’s homogenous conception of <American> identity. In sum, while
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Welles (1941/1943a, 1941/1943b, 1942/1943c) and Roosevelt (1941) each expressed a
commitment to <equality> and <liberty> across race, creed, and color, their programs
simultaneously precluded the possibility for non-dominant groups to protest discriminatory state
policies and actions.
The Negro Quarterly
In March of 1942, Angelo Herndon launched The Negro Quarterly: A Review of Negro
Life and Culture, a journal which declared its mission was to “reflect the true aspirations of the
Negro people and their traditions of struggle for freedom” (p. 3). Moreover, the journal
proclaimed:
The rapid change of life introduced by the war makes apparent the need of reflecting
upon the genuine attitudes, thoughts and opinions of Negroes, and of giving direction and
interpretation to certain new social and economic factors and their relation to the special
problems of the Negro. (p. 3)
A few weeks after the journal was founded, Herndon convinced black author and literary critic
Ralph Ellison to join the staff as managing editor (Rampersad, 2007). Ellison would influence
the thematic trajectory of the journal and would also contribute the “Editorial Comments” in
subsequent issues. The Negro Quarterly broke from contemporary black publications with its
devotion to radical socialism and racial militancy (Rampersad). Although The Negro Quarterly
only lasted four issues, its objectives were admirable; following the journal’s demise, Ellison
stated, “I went into [The Negro Quarterly] feeling that it was badly needed, since so little is
understood about Negroes even by themselves or by those dedicated, supposedly, to leading us”
(as cited in Rampersad, p. 158).
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Following the journal’s credo, Ellison’s editorials in The Negro Quarterly grappled with
the complexities of African American life during the WWII era. In particular, Ellison revealed
how the exigencies of WWII subordinated domestic issues to the demands of the war effort, thus,
stifling blacks’ struggle for civil rights. Ellison’s Negro Quarterly editorials culminated in a
1943 piece which outlined the three common ways African Americans approached the war
effort: (1) blind acceptance, (2) blind rejection, and (3) critical participation. According to
Ellison, if blacks hoped to gain equal political, social, and economic representation, critical
participation was the only productive course of action.
Ellison’s editorials in The Negro Quarterly demonstrated a rhetorical sensibility to the
wartime popularity of Roosevelt’s “The Four Freedoms” address. However, Ellison did not only
engage “The Four Freedoms” as an act of oratory, he also engaged <The Four Freedoms> as a
material discourse which signified the privileges of the dominant ideology. In order to explicate
the prejudices of U.S. and Allied forces, Ellison bracketed <The Four Freedoms> with the
ideographs <fascism> and <liberty>. In so doing, Ellison positioned <liberty> as the primary
goal of <The Four Freedoms>.
<Fascism>
Ellison opened his Negro Quarterly editorials by engaging the problem of <fascism>.
Ellison went beyond discussing <fascism> simply as it related to foreign aggression; rather, he
illuminated how <fascism> manifested domestically and undermined the principles of <The Four
Freedoms>. During WWII, the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy exemplified the evils of
<fascism> with their acts of political disfranchisement, racial discrimination, and ethnic
cleansing (Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2010). America’s wartime opposition to the fascist regimes in
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Germany and Italy, coupled with the explosion of anti-fascist propaganda, rendered <fascism> a
“devil term” (Weaver, 1985) in American society. Incongruously, as Americans publicly decried
the <fascism> of foreign aggressors, U.S. citizens continued to adhere to the racist doctrine of
Jim Crow. Honing in on such hypocrisy, Ellison (1943/1969c) stated: “Feeling that so much
experienced by Negroes in the U.S. is tinged with fascism, some Negroes went so far as to join
the pro-Japanese Pacific Movement” (p. 296). In other words, the experience of racism in the
U.S. left some blacks so alienated they supported the very nation who attacked their country.
However, Ellison rejected that position, arguing blacks had “their own stake in the defeat of
fascism” (p. 296, emphasis in original). Ellison’s example illustrated how <fascism> was more
than simply a foreign problem or threat to the future of U.S. <freedom>. On the contrary, Ellison
characterized <fascism> as a current, domestic dilemma, which had already plagued American
life for generations.
Gazing beyond the political boundaries of the U.S., Ellison (1942/1969a) examined how
<fascism> was undermining the purpose of the Allied Powers. Ellison contended the Allied
forces would struggle in “the war against fascist tyranny” until the “American Negroes, Africans,
Chinese, Indians, [and] Latin Americans” received equal citizenship within their respective
political systems (p. i). Ellison then elaborated how colonial oppression could negatively affect
the Allies’ wartime morale, arguing, “As the war progresses it becomes increasingly evident that
in order to fight fascism successfully a people must possess both a national will for its own
independence and the independence of all other nations” (p. ii). Ellison’s arguments downplayed
<fascism> within particular political contexts (e.g., Germany and Italy) and, instead, engaged
<fascism> as a cancer of the human condition. Ellison (1942/1969b) warned that even if Allied
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forces defeated Germany and Italy, unless <fascism> was properly engaged as an institution, and
eradicated as a way of human life, then <fascism> would simply re-materialize in other contexts
and spread from within like a “‘great sickness’” (p. 196). Overall, Ellison illustrated how the
problem of <fascism> would persist until the world’s dispossessed <peoples> were liberated
from subjugation and servitude.
Ellison’s ideographic characterization of <fascism> broke from contemporary
understandings. In particular, Ellison rejected the idea <fascism> was circumscribed within the
political boundaries of explicitly fascist nations; Ellison conceptualized <fascism> as a political
disease, capable of afflicting humans in any social context. By repositioning <fascism>, Ellison
was able to point out how <fascism> even left its mark on the U.S. and Allied forces.
<The Four Freedoms>
Ellison used <fascism> to critically frame the practical application of <The Four
Freedoms>. While Roosevelt’s (1941) “four essential human freedoms” provided guiding
principles for American involvement in WWII, Ellison questioned how adherents to <The Four
Freedoms> could tolerate systems of institutional racism and colonialism. Ellison (1942/1969b)
asserted, “[T]he Four Freedoms is a vision that must be embraced wholly or else it changes its
shape to confound us” (p. 196). Sensing the disconnect between theory and practice, Ellison
(1942/1969a) declared:
American Negroes are seeking to understand their relationship to the Four Freedoms …
and they look with distrust upon the good intentions of America when they know that Jim
Crow still persists in the armed forces of the country as the most irritating symbol of their
social and political debasement. (p. ii)
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Ellison’s assertion suggested <The Four Freedoms> did not speak to the asymmetrical power
relations which subjugated African Americans. However, Ellison (1943/1969c) admonished
those blacks who viewed such underrepresentation as grounds for blind acceptance of state
policies:
Along with this is found an acceptance of the violence and discrimination which so
contradicts a war for the Four Freedoms. This attitude is justified by the theory that for
Negroes to speak out in their own interest would be to follow a ‘narrow Negro approach’
and to disrupt war unity. (p. 295)
Ellison adopted a critical tone with respect to <The Four Freedoms>, yet he still maintained
confidence in the potential of <The Four Freedoms>.In order for the potential to be realized,
however, Ellison contended <The Four Freedoms> “must be sloganized in terms of the specific
national aspirations of all peoples” (p. v, emphasis in original). Ellison’s stipulation indicates
how <The Four Freedoms> were expressed to reflect the values and concerns of the dominant
white majority. African Americans did not possess the same political and material advantages as
the white majority, thus, blacks had a harder time identifying with the aims Roosevelt (1941)
articulated in “The Four Freedoms.” Indeed, how does one sacrifice for the defense of
<freedom>, when institutional constraints limit <freedom>?
Given the dislocation of <The Four Freedoms>, Ellison (1942/1969a) called for African
Americans and colonial <peoples> to express their relationship to the war effort from their own
positionalities. Ellison utilized the rhetorical currency of <The Four Freedoms> to resist the
restrictions which Roosevelt imposed, in turn, providing non-dominant groups the space to selfdefine the pursuit of <freedom>. Ellison (1942/1969a) extended the following question: “[I]n the
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new light of the Four Freedoms: why should not decisions relative to the national aspirations of
American Negroes rest with themselves rather than with those outside their own group?” (p. iii).
Ellison then harnessed <The Four Freedoms> to define the nature of WWII:
if this war is to be a peoples’ war, based upon the Four Freedoms, then along with the
discarded techniques of imperialist domination must go all of the old imperialist
definitions and classifications of minority and colonial peoples. All peoples must be
allowed to define themselves! (p. iv)
Ellison critiqued how “minority and colonial peoples” lacked the self-determination to assert
their own social and political concerns. Utilizing <The Four Freedoms> to characterize WWII as
a “peoples’ war,” Ellison removed the emphasis from nation states and, instead, centered the
focus on liberating the oppressed.
Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic usage of <The Four
Freedoms> illuminated how <The Four Freedoms> failed to capture the experiences of African
Americans and colonial <peoples>. However, instead of rejecting <The Four Freedoms>, Ellison
called for dispossessed <peoples> to engage the underlying principles of <The Four Freedoms>
in a way so that they could articulate their own <freedom> struggle. Ultimately, by associating
<The Four Freedoms> with colonial <peoples>, Ellison was able to frame liberation as the
primary goal of WWII.
<Liberty>
Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) accent on <liberty> offered an
alternative to the dominant assumption that the Allied goal was to preserve <freedom>.
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Moreover, Ellison’s reinvention enabled him to define the standards by which Roosevelt’s
leadership should be measured:
The test of a Democratic leader’s greatness lies in his ability to perform great liberating
actions through mastery of politics and military strategy to the point that the old and
hindering in men’s lives may be discarded and the century of the “common man” …
might be brought into being. (p. 195)
By calling for “the century of the ‘common man,’” Ellison appropriated the key metaphor from
Vice President Henry A. Wallace’s (1942) address to the Free World Association, in which
Wallace proclaimed WWII could only be resolved by “an economic peace that is just, charitable
and enduring” (para. 19). Ellison’s (1942/1969b) adoption of the “common man” motif signaled
a critique of the class disparities which prevented some <peoples> from experiencing the
<freedom> which Roosevelt (1941) described in “The Four Freedoms.” Such class
consciousness prompted Ellison (1942/1969a) to declare, “This is a peoples’ war for national
liberation, and it must be fought and won by the people” (p. i, emphasis in original). In so doing,
Ellison dissociated <liberty> from the machinery of governments and, instead, identified actual
human experience as the barometer of <liberty>.
Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) editorials indirectly appealed to
<liberty> by revealing deficiencies in the dominant understandings of <democracy> and
<freedom>. By modifying <democracy> and <freedom> with qualifying terms (e.g. “true,”
“full,” etc.), Ellison exposed how the meanings of <democracy> and <freedom> shifted
according to social and political context. First, Ellison revealed an absence of <liberty> by
problematizing <democracy>. In light of <The Four Freedoms>, Ellison (1942/1969b) argued
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the U.S. could not resolve international domination until its own domestic inequities were
reconciled:
[I]f the President cannot master the problem of freedom for all here at home, how can he
hope to win freedom for the whole world? History moves from the specific to the
general; the key to a world victory for democracy lies in the victory of full democracy in
the U.S. and in British territories. (p. 195, emphasis added)
In Ellison’s calculus, if the U.S. and Great Britain wished to spearhead the cause for international
<democracy>, first, they needed to resolve the racism and colonialism which plagued their own
boundaries. Ellison’s indictment of <democracy> extended beyond the realm of executive
leadership; he also criticized black civic leaders. In critiquing the paternalism which had
historically guided middle class black leaders, Ellison (1942/1969a) suggested these stateendorsed black leaders did not adequately address the complexities of the black experience.
According to Ellison, in order to voice the social and political inequities which confronted black
America, the public dialogue needed to reflect the mood of the black proletariat: “They have
created a culture and the basic outlines of a truly democratic vision of life” (p. iii, emphasis
added). Whereas state-endorsed black leaders functioned like mouthpieces for the dominant
ideology, the black folk would express the authentic struggles of the black experience.
Second, Ellison (1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) illustrated a need for <liberty> by fixating on
<freedom>. Ellison (1943/1969c) advocated an attitude which “believes the historical role of
Negroes to be that of integrating the larger American nation and compelling it untiringly toward
true freedom” (p. 298, emphasis added). Thus, Ellison crafted a framework wherein Americans
could not experience “true” <freedom> until blacks had successfully integrated into society.
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Such logic is rhetorically significant because as Ellison diagnosed the imperfections of American
society, he simultaneously prescribed blacks as the catalysts of <freedom>. Ellison (1942/1969b)
further sketched the inefficacy of <freedom> by comparing the wartime programs of American
Vice President Henry A. Wallace and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Ellison favored
Wallace’s (1942) position, particularly his appeals to “the common man.” However, Ellison
(1942/1969b) feared the “the long, bloody, hate-ridden years of Imperialism and racial
chauvinism, [gave] Churchill’s words a meaning that chills minority and colonial minds” (p.
196). Whichever approach U.S. officials implemented, Ellison maintained “American Negroes
shall continue to seek democratic freedom regardless of where it lies, and the ‘common man’ of
the world will be with them” (p. 240, emphasis added). Although Wallace and Churchill each
advocated <The Four Freedoms>, Ellison distinguished Wallace’s approach as the more
“democratic” version of <freedom>. By asserting that blacks would continue to “seek” such
“democratic” <freedom>, Ellison implied that, in its current state, U.S. <freedom> was
inequitable.
Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) questioned the substance behind the
American and Allied wartime aims. Rather than fall in line with the doctrine of <The Four
Freedoms>, Ellison pointed to the inequities which plagued African Americans and colonial
<peoples>, contending such disparities were grounds to position <liberty> as the central motive
of the war effort. Ellison’s discursive shift suggested <The Four Freedoms> would be politically
inept unless freeing philosophy translated into the liberation of dispossessed <peoples>. Ellison’s
contestation of the dominant ideology injected an alternative narrative into the wartime
discourse.
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Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) editorials in The Negro Quarterly
changed the scope and trajectory of the wartime effort. First, Ellison utilized <fascism> to
critique the inequities of U.S. and Allied race relations. In so doing, Ellison problematized the
dominant assumption that U.S. and Allied forces signified an ultimate good. Second, Ellison
advocated the principles of <The Four Freedoms> but insisted <peoples> must be allowed to
engage <The Four Freedoms> according to their own cultural needs. Grounding <The Four
Freedoms> in cultural experience illustrated <freedom> was an illusory goal unless <peoples>
had a role in defining <freedom>. Third, by texturing the vision of <The Four Freedoms>,
Ellison redefined the primary goal of U.S. and Allied forces, supplanting <freedom> with
<liberty>. With greater emphasis on <liberty>, Ellison revealed how dispossessed <peoples>
must first be liberated before they could fight a war for <freedom>.
The Dialectic of <The Four Freedoms>
The tenor of Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) editorials deviated from
the wartime rhetoric of President Roosevelt and other U.S. officials. In “The Four Freedoms,”
Roosevelt (1941) sought to foster a harmonious wartime climate wherein Americans would be
united around ideals such as <freedom>, <security>, and <patriotism>. Ellison (1942/1969a,
1942/1969b, 1943/1969c), on the other hand, exposed how racial discrimination undermined the
U.S. and Allied commitment to <The Four Freedoms>. Given the discursive discrepancy, I
utilize Lucaites and Condit’s (1990) culturetypal/counter-cultural perspective to examine “the
interplay of material conditions of social existence and rhetoric” (p. 7). Following Lucaites and
Condit’s framework, I contend Roosevelt’s (1941) “The Four Freedoms” signifies a culturetypal
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appeal and Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) editorials in The Negro Quarterly
represent a counter-cultural appeal.
Roosevelt’s (1941) insistence upon national <freedom> served to minimize difference as
a way of channeling the flux of American opinions into a singular, homogenous vision for the
U.S. war effort. Lucaites and Condit (1990) argued, “Rhetors who successfully rearrange and
revivify the culturally established public vocabulary to produce social change are masters of
culturetypal rhetoric” (p. 8). Roosevelt’s (1941) ideographic usage in “The Four Freedoms”
exemplifies culturetypal rhetoric, because he invoked pre-existing American values in order to
establish the primacy of a nuanced version of <freedom>. Roosevelt initiated his revivification
of <freedom> by harnessing the threat of foreign <tyranny> to produce doubts about the future
of U.S. <freedom>. Establishing such a rhetorical canvas enabled Roosevelt to portray
<security> as the foundation of U.S. <freedom>. With emphasis on <security>, Roosevelt
galvanized support for defense initiatives: “The need of the moment is that our actions and our
policy should be devoted primarily—almost exclusively—to meeting this foreign peril. For all
our domestic problems are now a part of the great emergency” (para. 19). Roosevelt implied all
domestic concerns must be subordinated to the war effort; if the U.S. were stripped of
<freedom>, Americans would no longer enjoy the right to deliberate over domestic concerns.
Thus, the presence of <tyranny> demanded Americans support any initiatives which would
strengthen U.S. <security> and preserve U.S. <freedom>. Roosevelt suggested Americans could
support U.S. <security> efforts by dedicating themselves to <patriotism> and <unity>. In sum,
by drawing a series of related, ideographic connections, Roosevelt imposed an enthymematic
logic in which the preservation of U.S. <freedom> hinged upon Americans’ commitment to
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<security>, <patriotism>, and <unity>. Crafting such an ideological landscape prioritized the
vitality of the republic over the experiences of the groups and individuals who constituted the
republic, thus, discouraging dissent from state policies.
Roosevelt’s (1941) discourse in “The Four Freedoms” highlighted threats to U.S.
<freedom> which, in turn, precipitated an ideological climate in the U.S. which predominantly
focused on preserving <freedom>. However, in emphasizing the preservation of <freedom>,
U.S. public officials characterized <freedom> as a pre-existing condition which Americans
universally experienced. Such a conception of <freedom> rhetorically deflected the
asymmetrical distribution of U.S. <freedom>. In other words, while the dominant discourse
advocated <freedom>, it failed to convey how <freedom> was not a universal experience.
African Americans were all too familiar with the reality that <freedom> shifted according to
one’s positionality within a given context. Ellison’s editorials in The Negro Quarterly criticized
the proponents of <The Four Freedoms> failure to articulate a program which reflected the
experiences of African Americans and colonial <peoples> throughout the world. According to
Lucaites and Condit (1990), “when conditions arise that invite or require social change,
especially when a displaced group seeks to have its interest granted some kind of public
legitimacy, the public vocabulary needs to be managed and reconstituted” (p. 8). Bridled by the
dominant ideology’s stringent demands for <patriotism> and <unity>, Ellison (1942/1969a,
1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) sought to underscore the needs of blacks and colonial <peoples> by
reinventing <The Four Freedoms>. Lucaites and Condit (1990) argued, “Those rhetors who
introduce new—and thus culturally unauthorized—characterizations and narrative to the public
vocabulary and who challenge existing characterizations and narratives are masters of counter-
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cultural rhetoric” (p. 8). Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic usage in
his wartime editorials constitutes a counter-cultural rhetoric, because in exposing the biases of
<The Four Freedoms>, he repositioned <liberty> as the primary aim of the U.S. and Allied war
effort. Ellison illustrated how imposing a homogenous conception of <freedom>—as <The Four
Freedoms> did—would only perpetuate the systems of domination which the U.S. and Allied
forces claimed to oppose. Ultimately, Ellison (1943/1969c) concluded, “Freedom, after all,
cannot be imported or acquired through an act of philanthropy, it must be won” (p. 300).
Ellison’s counter-cultural rhetoric illuminated how <freedom> is baseless unless <peoples> are
at <liberty> to articulate their own political, social, and economic needs.
Although Roosevelt (1941) and Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) utilized
similar ideographs to articulate their programs, when engaged in dialogue, their positions clash
in discord. The dissonance stems from the material conditions and rhetorical motives which
separated their discourses. Faced with the executive pressures of a nation at war, Roosevelt
(1941) needed to craft a platform capable of garnering widespread support for the policies and
actions of the federal government. Thus, Roosevelt centered his appeal on <freedom>—a symbol
which both conjured the nation’s storied past and diametrically opposed the actions of foreign
aggressors. Exemplifying the privileges of his identity as an elite, white male, Roosevelt
characterized <freedom> as the foundation of American life—a condition which he discussed in
terms of preservation. Contrastingly, although Ellison also (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b,
1943/1969c) responded to the exigencies of WWII, moreover, he sought to critique the presence
of <The Four Freedoms> as a state-sanctioned, material discourse. As an African American born
into a system of institutional racism and Jim Crow segregation, Ellison had experienced the

85
scorn of racial prejudice firsthand, and understood his civil liberties were reduced simply on the
basis of his skin color. In Ellison’s assessment, the version of <freedom> which Roosevelt
(1941) advocated wrongfully assumed the universality of experience. In the end, the difference
of Roosevelt and Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic usages boil down
to the matter of audience.
Interpretive Clashes of <The Four Freedoms>
The ideographic clash between Roosevelt (1941) and Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b,
1943/1969c) exemplifies the asymmetrical power distribution which pervaded U.S. society
during WWII (Moore, 2005; Takaki, 2000; Wynn, 2010). Institutional racism and Jim Crow
segregation produced an environment where race was an immutable signifier of power. Although
Roosevelt’s (1941) culturetypal rhetoric in “The Four Freedoms” was by no means explicitly
racist, his ideographic usage perpetuated hegemonic structures which trapped African Americans
within the existing discriminatory system. Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c)
responded with a counter-cultural reinvention which challenged dominant assumptions and
expressed black and minority viewpoints. The dialectical tension which results from their
contested interpretations of <The Four Freedoms> raises questions about audiences and motives.
The presence of the contested interpretations signifies what McKerrow (1989) termed a
“polysemic critique” (p. 108). According to McKerrow, “A polysemic critique is one which
uncovers a subordinate or secondary reading which contains the seeds of subversion or rejection
of authority, at the same time that the primary reading appears to confirm power of the dominant
cultural norms” (p. 108). However, as rhetorical scholars have highlighted, the term “polysemy”
is problematic because it has been characterized in disparate, oftentimes contradictory,
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terminologies (Ceccarelli, 1998; Condit, 1989; Jasinski, 2001). Condit (1989) contended
instances of resistive reading more accurately indicate a text is “polyvalent.” Specifically, Condit
argued, “Polyvalence occurs when audience member share understanding of the denotations of a
text but disagree about the valuation of those denotations to such a degree that they produce
notably different interpretations” (p. 106). Ceccarelli (1998) similarly maintained “polysemy”
exists when audiences disagree about a text’s denotation; “polyvalence” occurs when audiences
agree about a text’s denotation, but disagree about the implications of the denotation.
Roosevelt (1941) and Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) expressed
contrasting ideographic commitments in relation to <The Four Freedoms>. The incongruity
illuminates how their rhetoric sought differing: (1) audiences and (2) social responses. First,
Roosevelt (1941) and Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) each appealed to their
audience by invoking a sense of “the people” (McGee, 1975); however, while Roosevelt (1941)
called upon <people>, Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) called upon <peoples>.
As McGee (1987) concluded from his study of the ideograph <people(s)>, Americans’ penchant
for using the singular <people> instead of the plural <peoples> is indicative of the coordinated
American commitments to individuality and private property. Yet, according to McGee, while
the usage of <people> asserts the value of private property, it simultaneously homogenizes
conceptions of American identity. The rhetorical construction of an archetypal <American>
results in the political underrepresentation of cultural minorities. Ellison (1942/1969a) alluded to
such a condition when he called for black leaders to develop forms of protest which aimed for “a
real representative government which includes Negro members of the House of Representatives,
the Senate, the Supreme Court, the President’s Cabinet, and all other powerful governmental
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committees” (p. v, emphasis in original). Moreover, Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b,
1943/1969c) consistently discussed <The Four Freedoms> in terms of how they influenced the
world’s “dispossessed,” “oppressed,” “colonial,” and “darker” <peoples>. In “The Four
Freedoms,” Roosevelt (1941) never once used the plural <peoples>. Rather, Roosevelt called for
material and symbolic sacrifices in the name of a singular American <people>.
Second, the ideographic clash between Roosevelt (1941) and Ellison (1942/1969a,
1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) reveals how their rhetoric aimed to produce different social responses.
Roosevelt’s (1941) ideographic usages constituted a rhetoric of control. Roosevelt harnessed the
threat of<tyranny> to correlate <freedom> with <security>, thus, imposing a homogenous
concept of the American <people>. Roosevelt drew upon the demands of <patriotism> and
<unity> to animate his simplified sketch of the American <people>. Roosevelt’s appeal
cultivated a wartime landscape which precluded dissent from state policies. Ellison’s
(1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) subsequent reinvention of <The Four Freedoms>
constituted a rhetoric of liberation. Ellison enacted the material discourse of <The Four
Freedoms> in response to state-sanctioned ideological boundaries. In so doing, Ellison utilized
<The Four Freedoms> as an opening wedge for highlighting the dominant ideology’s failure to
articulate the concerns of African Americans and colonial <peoples>. Ellison’s emphasis on the
plurality of <peoples> revealed how monolithic appeals overlook the needs and concerns of the
oppressed.
The exigencies of WWII posed African American spokespersons with considerable
rhetorical constraints. The pre-existing political, social, and economic disparities which plagued
blacks were compounded by a wartime discourse which failed to represent the concerns of black
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America. Ralph Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) editorials in The Negro
Quarterly responded to this cultural need by reinventing the ideographic dimensions of <The
Four Freedoms>. Ellison’s advocacy for the liberation of dispossessed <peoples> challenged
dominant assumptions and offered a rhetorical alternative to the state-sanctioned discourse.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IMPLICATIONS

In 1952, Ralph Ellison published the novel Invisible Man, the story of an unnamed,
African American who struggles through America’s racial divisions during the second quarter of
the 20th century. Ellison’s anonymous narrator opened the novel by describing the conditions of
his “invisibility”:
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor
am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and
bone, fiber and liquids—and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible,
understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see
sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard,
distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or
figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except for me. (p. 3)
Reflecting on his work three decades after its original publication, Ellison (1981/1995) declared
his nameless, “invisible” protagonist was borne out of a desire “to manipulate imaginatively
those possibilities that existed both in Afro-American personality and in the restricted structure
of American society” (p. xxi). Invisible Man, then, was more than merely an expression of
imagination and literary freedom; rather, as Ellison described the work, Invisible Man was a
highly political and rhetorical venture:
[M]y task was one of revealing the human universals hidden within the plight of one
who was both black and American, and not only as a means of conveying my personal
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vision of possibility, but as a way of dealing with the sheer rhetorical challenge involved
in communicating across our barriers of race and religion, class, color and region—
barriers which consist of the many strategies of division that were designed, and still
function, to prevent what would otherwise have been a more or less natural recognition of
the reality of black and white fraternity. (p. xxii)
Viewed from an ideological perspective, the above quotation reveals two distinct readings. First,
one views Ellison’s emphasis on “human universals” as an agency for overcoming the “strategies
of division” which prevented blacks and whites from living in “fraternity”—“fraternity” here
implying brotherhood. On the other hand, his insistence on the double-consciousness which
plagued “one who was both black and American” exposes an ironic reading where “fraternity”
more closely resembles “faction.” Whereas the first reading gives way to a “black and white”
brotherhood, the second reading signals “the reality of black and white” factions. The latter
draws into focus the ideological barriers which posed Ellison and other black rhetors with
rhetorical challenges during the WWII era. From the second angle, blacks were not oppressed by
“strategies of division”; on the contrary, blacks were stifled by U.S. officials’ appeals to national
<unity>. In other words, by centering collective values, U.S. officials’ precluded black
spokespersons from voicing the specific frustrations of black America—in essence, rendering the
needs of black America invisible.
Following Ellison’s (1981/1995) position, my concluding chapter problematizes the
intersections of race and the American experience. In particular, my insights extend from a
perspective where race is textured through the material collusion of rhetoric, ideology, and
history. Accordingly, Chapter Five meditates on three particular intersections. First, Ellison’s
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(1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) reinvention of <The Four Freedoms> is indicative of a
longstanding tradition of African American mimesis (Wilson, 2003). Thus, I aim to illuminate
how Ellison’s use of mimesis suggested a fragmented sense of identity among African
Americans during the era. Second, I examine how the ideological barriers evidenced in the
WWII era signal ideology’s role in the articulation of cultural experiences. Third, I explore how
my project identifies the need for pedagogical advances in scholarship on black rhetorical history
and public memory. Finally, I close by analyzing how my insights from Chapter Four inform
contemporary understandings of race discourse.
Mimesis in African American Rhetoric
Whether explicitly or implicitly, rhetorical critics typically follow Aristotle’s (c. 350
BC/2007) contention, “Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the
available means of persuasion” (p. 123). Rhetorical critics engage texts by analyzing how rhetors
shape their discourse in accordance with the demands of the context. Bitzer (1968) echoed such
logic when he argued rhetors respond to the demands of rhetorical situations. Ellison’s
(1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) editorials in The Negro Quarterly reflect the classic
rhetorical model. Ellison responded to U.S. ideological commitments within the context of
WWII. Ellison’s reinvention of <The Four Freedoms> signified an instance of mimesis.
Scholars have illustrated the polysemic nature of mimesis (Haskins, 2000; Terrill, 2011;
Wilson, 2003). Haskins (2000) signaled mimesis’s polysemy by demonstrating how classical
rhetoricians distinguished “mimesis as representation from mimesis as performative imitation and
audience identification” (p. 7, emphasis in original). Wilson (2003), however, rejected the
dichotomy and pursued the concept mimesis under the heading “imitation.” Wilson showed
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mimesis’s recurrence within African American discursive practice. Ellison’s (1942/1969a,
1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) nuanced appropriation of <The Four Freedoms> exemplified mimesis
because he enacted his critique by imitating President Roosevelt’s (1941) rhetorical appeal. In
essence, Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) formulated his critique of institutional
racism by fusing his “internal talents” with the “external resources” of the culture (Terrill, 2011,
p. 302). The rhetorical imitation displayed in Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c)
wartime editorials, provides textual evidence for the modern viability of mimesis as a discursive
practice.
According to Wilson (2003), studying mimesis in African American rhetoric may help
orient rhetoricians to “the intersections of racism, rhetorical theory, and discursive practice” (p.
89). Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic usage in The Negro Quarterly,
particularly his adoption of <The Four Freedoms>, echoes Wilson’s (2003) position. Wilson
argued blacks have historically “imitated the dominant culture to obtain a measure of
independence and to establish grounds for their inclusion in the body politic” (p. 89). In
particular, by (re)characterizing <The Four Freedoms> as an agency for liberating colonial
<peoples>, Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) “imitated cultural norms” to adopt
and extend “the ideals of citizenship” (Wilson, 2003, p. 89). Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b,
1943/1969c) harnessed the norms of the dominant ideology as an agency for subverting the
prejudicial structures of the dominant ideology. According to Terrill (2011), the dialectical
tension which results from mimesis illustrated how “the process of rhetorical invention relies on
the analysis of texts produced by others, which in turn forces the realization that public texts
necessarily bear the imprint of multiple authors” (p. 302). Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b,
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1943/1969c) attempted to challenge the dominant ideology through mimesis, demonstrating how,
during the epoch, African Americans were confronted by the problemitization of fragmented
identities. In other words, although Ellison critiqued the system which subjugated blacks, he
chose the machinery of the system as the most prudent vehicle for doing so. While whites
dissociated themselves from blacks, blacks did not possess the autonomy to dissociate
themselves from the very system of oppression.
Exploring African American mimesis during the WWII era is significant. The analysis
demonstrates how the institutional racism of the epoch precluded rhetorical identification
between blacks and whites. Indeed, as Wilson (2003) pointed out, during the antebellum period,
the logic of racial difference made it impossible for European Americans to acknowledge any
likenesses to African Americans—even when empirical evidence proved otherwise. Within the
context of WWII, the state employed a discourse which demanded <unity> from all U.S.
citizens. Although the expectation of African American conformity implicated blacks in full U.S.
citizenship, they were not granted the equality which established such demands for <unity>. Yet,
as Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) editorials demonstrated, mimesis can be
utilized to interrogate such iniquitous structures and protest discriminatory systems.
Ideological Foundations of Cultural Rhetoric
McGee’s (1979, 1980) ideograph construct suggests rhetoric and ideology converge in
the material form of abstract terms (e.g., <freedom>, <liberty>, <justice>). Lucaites and Condit’s
(1990) methodological advancement of the ideograph model illustrates how the connotations of
ideographs can vary across cultural positionalities. In other words, although ideographs are
summary terms which express collective values and principles, ideographs can be appropriated
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in ways which either reaffirm the beliefs of the cultural majority (culturetypal), or in ways which
deviate from and even critique the cultural majority (counter-cultural). Ellison’s (1942/1969a,
1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic usage in The Negro Quarterly signifies a counter-cultural
appropriation because he reinvented existing ideographic commitments to craft a vision which
articulated the cultural experiences of African Americans and minority <peoples>. The presence
of synchronic ideographic contestations across racial contexts highlights how ideographs can
possess constitutive value when they intersect with signifiers of identity (e.g., race, class,
gender).
Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic reinvention of <The Four
Freedoms> was predicated on the reality that black Americans did not possess the same rights as
white Americans. However, without the exigence of institutional racism, the tenor of Ellison’s
critique would change shape, or perhaps cease to exist. Since Roosevelt’s (1941) ideographic
usage advanced a discourse which further perpetuated existing systems of racial discrimination,
Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) was compelled to challenge those ideographs and
provide a reorientation to articulate the concerns of African Americans and colonial <peoples>.
Ellison’s ideographic appropriation of <The Four Freedoms> functioned constitutively because
he purged the ideograph of its dominant connotations and, instead, articulated a specific,
culturally-grounded experience. As Charland (1987) elucidated in his analysis of the people
quebecois, when a society is inundated by multiple, competing subject positions, its subjects may
experience a degree of recalcitrance. Charland argued, “Successful new constitutive rhetorics
offer new subject positions that resolve, or at least contain, experienced contradictions. They
serve to overcome or define away the recalcitrance the world presents by providing the subject
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with new perspectives and motives” (p. 142). By reframing <The Four Freedoms> and, in effect,
the purpose of the U.S. and Allied war effort, Ellison (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c)
rejected the state’s appeals to preserving <freedom> and, instead, mobilized blacks around the
ideographic platform of <liberty>.
As Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic reinvention exhibited,
ideographs possess the potential to function constitutively in conjunction with any material
signifier of identity (e.g., race, class, gender). Delgado (1995) demonstrated when non-dominant
groups harness ideographs from counter-cultural stances, they wield the power to constitute their
identities in opposition to the dominant forms of oppression. However, as Morrissey (2010)
illustrated, culturally-grounded, ideographic reinvention does not always equate to immediate
political success. Indeed, although Ellison’s (1942/1969a, 1942/1969b, 1943/1969c) ideographic
usage was aimed at gaining social and political rights for African Americans, those rights would
not materialize in legislative action until two decades later with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
However, if one conceptualizes black civil rights discourse as a linear continuum, Ellison’s
wartime editorials then function as one of many black voices which collectively contributed to
the exploits of the modern civil rights movement.
Exploring Pedagogical Advances
In many ways, my project began as many rhetorical inquiries do—with the discovery of a
contradiction. Specifically, I was mystified by how so many Americans could bestow the WWII
era with the moniker “the greatest generation” (Brokaw, 2004) when, concurrently, the era was
pervaded by Jim Crow segregation. Thus in closing, I reflect on how my project indicates the
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need for pedagogical advances in future scholarship on both public memory and black rhetorical
history.
First, my project demonstrates scholars should develop a more thorough engagement with
the problematic of public memory. In the past two decades several scholars have approached
various problems related to public memory (Balthrop, Blair, & Michel, 2010; Biesecker, 2002;
Browne, 1995; Bostdorff, 2003, 2011; Dunn, 2010; Kahl & Leff, 2004; Noon, 2004; Phillips,
2010; Wilson, 2010), few studies have focused explicitly on the intersections of memory and
race (Browne, 1999; Goodnight & Olson, 2006; Wilbur, 2002), and none of the published
literature has examined how race factors in to the memory of WWII. WWII’s vaunted status
within contemporary American culture (Biesecker, 2002) provides scholars with a compelling
reason to further examine the ways in which race has been reduced to the unspoken Other in
WWII memory. As Goodnight and Olson (2006) argued, when dominant conceptions of public
memory are contested, space opens for new interpretive evaluations. Provided such deliberative
space, “[a]dvocates may reach backward and attempt to revalue past events, move laterally to
unsettle present attributions of identity, and imagine a future where new precedents redraw
political alignment and norms” (p. 610). Accordingly, sustained analyses of the intersections of
WWII and race might help to (1) problematize the rhetorical legacy of WWII; (2) resolve
contemporary problems of racial representation which stem from historical omission; and (3)
safeguard against future tribulations regarding war and race.
Second, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, in the early 20th century, African
American spokespersons negotiated the ideological boundaries of institutional racism.
Specifically, my project has honed in on a largely celebrated epoch in U.S. history and, upon
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rhetorical analysis, has revealed how, despite the systemic repression of African Americans,
black spokespersons still managed to formulate thoughtful rhetorical strategies for critiquing the
interrelated issues of racism, colonialism, and imperialism. Yet, in spite of such rhetorical
ingenuity, scholars have largely failed to examine the dimensions of black discourse from the
epoch—only further underscoring the historic influence of U.S. institutional racism. Such
scholarly omission contributes to the already truncated narratives which afflict black rhetorical
history. My project problematizes the conventional perspective of black civil rights rhetoric
which views the oratory of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as the genesis of the modern black
freedom struggle. On the contrary, I shed light on how King’s tremendous accomplishments
were preceded by a complex and robust history of black protest. Ultimately, the process of
illumination is what shall add texture and depth to the existing literature on black rhetorical
history. As Ellison’s “Invisible Man” contended, “Without light I am not only invisible, but
formless as well; and to be unaware of one’s form is to live a death” (Ellison, 1952/1995, p. 7).
Implications for Contemporary U.S. Culture
I opened this project by pointing out the way Barack Obama conspicuously appealed to
the memory of WWII in his 2008 address, “A More Perfect Union.” In the speech, Obama
invoked the memory of WWII to illustrate a time in U.S. history where Americans overcame
their collective differences in the name of a greater good. Obama’s message was clear:
Americans must transcend the divisions of their racial past. The week after Obama’s address,
conservative columnist, William Kristol (2008), remarked:
The only part of the speech that made me shudder was this sentence: “But race is an issue
that I believe this nation cannot afford to ignore right now.”
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As soon as I heard that, I knew what we’d have to endure. I knew that there would be a
stampede of editorial boards, columnists and academics rushing not to ignore race. A
national conversation about race! At long last! (para. 9-10)
However, such has not been the case. As Brown (2011) pointed out, dating back to his
presidential campaign, Obama’s discourse has largely fostered the feeling “that racism is part of
a bygone era” (p. 551). Brown explained how such discourse serves “to alter one’s sense of
[America’s] racist past by reinforcing collective visions in the present that would possibly inform
racial ideologies of the future” (p. 543). For example, in “A More Perfect Union,” one observes
how Obama (2008) responded to a racial controversy by harnessing the collective memory of
WWII—depicting the era as a time when Americans transcended their racial differences. Such
appeals are problematic because of the way the postracial discourse de-problematizes race,
projecting an America “wherein the boundaries of race have been surpassed and where racism is
no longer a central problem” (Brown, p. 546). To return to my analysis from Chapter Four,
during WWII, Ralph Ellison criticized President Roosevelt for his failure to articulate the
institutional racism which undermined Americans’ commitment to <The Four Freedoms>. The
tragic irony is, six decades later, with an African American president in The White House, the
problem of institutional racism is still being avoided.
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